# ASU RV Cards – Round 7 vs. Stanford GS (Aff)

## 1AC

### Inherency

#### Observation One: Inherency

#### Obama pushing nuclear incentives now.

Pistilli 12 (Melissa, reporting on market-shaking news in the resource and mining investment sector with Resource Investing News since 2008, 10-11-12, “Nuclear Power Prominent in US Presidential Candidates’ Energy Policies” 10/11 <http://uraniuminvestingnews.com/12783/nuclear-power-united-states-energy-policies-romney-obama-election.html>)

The Obama administration’s energy policy supports the expansion of nuclear energy. Under Obama, the government’s 2012 budget allocated $36 billion in loan guarantees for new nuclear reactors and more than $800 million in loan guarantees for nuclear research, an IBISWorld report states. The research report also highlights Obama’s Clean Electricity Standard and its push for more electricity to be produced from zero-carbon sources. “These climate-change policies will lead to a boost in nuclear-energy production,” said IBISWorld. New nuclear reactors approved This year, the US approved construction of reactors for the first time in nearly 30 years; they are expected to come online by 2017. The Southern Company (NYSE:SO) won approval from the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to construct two new reactors at its Vogtle power plant near Waynesboro, Georgia. Currently, another 16 plants across the country have applied to the NRC to build 25 more reactors. Last month, the NRC issued a license that allows General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment (GLE) to build and operate the first uranium enrichment plant with classified laser technology, a more cost-effective process than employing centrifuges. The plant “could provide a steady supply of uranium enriched right here in the US to the country’s nuclear reactors,” GLE CEO Chris Monetta said. The US Department of Energy (DOE) “has played a pivotal role in advancing a public-private cost-sharing program that supports the development of smaller reactors,” according to former Environmental Protection Agency administrator and former New Jersey Governor Christine Todd Whitman and Dr. Patrick More, co-founder and former leader of Greenpeace — current co-chairs of the Clean and Safe Energy Coalition. Where will waste go? However, the US nuclear revival has been held up by the fact that the country lacks a long-term plan for dealing with nuclear waste. Currently, most plants keep waste onsite in temporary storage pools, but that is only a short-term solution to a long-term problem. In June 2012, a federal appeals court ruled that the NRC has not provided “reasonable assurance” that it has a long-term waste-management solution — as a result, the NRC will not be approving any new projects for some time. The plan had been to move waste to a repository at Nevada’s Yucca Mountain. The US government has already signed contracts with several utilities, including Southern, for waste disposal at Yucca Mountain. The repository was supposed to open in 1998, but politics and legal issues stalled the project for years. Obama put the project on ice in 2010, appointing the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future to develop recommendations for creating a safe, long-term solution to nuclear waste management and storage. The Commission delivered its final report in January of this year, calling for the creation of a federal agency aimed at soliciting and evaluating voluntary proposals from states interested in hosting nuclear disposal areas. The idea is similar to what Romney proposed in October 2011 and would involve states offering disposal sites in exchange for monetary compensation. What next? The freeze on new reactor approvals hasn’t stopped the Obama administration from pushing forward on nuclear energy research and development. In late September, the US Department of Energy announced $13 million in funding for university-led nuclear innovation projects under the Nuclear Energy University Programs (NEUP). “The awards … build upon the Obama Administration’s broader efforts to promote a sustainable nuclear industry in the U.S. and cultivate the next generation of scientists and engineers,” the DOE press release states. The funding was awarded to research groups at the Georgia Institute of Technology, the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and the University of Tennessee.

#### There’s global expansion of nuclear now – Fukushima doesn’t matter.

Marketwire 12 (5/3/12, – Part of the Paragon Report on uranium ore stock future

<http://finance.yahoo.com/news/nuclear-renaissance-back-track-122000381.html>)

NEW YORK, NY--(Marketwire -05/03/12)- Last year the Fukushima disaster in Japan started a downward spiral for companies in the Uranium Industry. Approximately one year later the industry looks to be finally recovering as the Global X Uranium ETF (URA) is up nearly 12 percent year-to-date. "Fukushima put a speed bump on the road to the nuclear renaissance," Ganpat Mani, president of Converdyn, said at a nuclear industry summit. "It's not going to delay the programs around the world." The Paragon Report examines investing opportunities in the Uranium Industry and provides equity research on Cameco Corporation (CCJ - News) and Uranium One, Inc. (UUU.TO - News). Approximately 650 million people in China and India currently are living without electricity. With the high costs of fossil fuel the most viable options for these countries would be nuclear power. Indonesia, Egypt, and Chile are among some of the nations that have plans to build their first nuclear power station, the list of countries operating atomic plants currently stands at 30. According to numbers released by the World Nuclear Association there are 61 reactors that are presently under construction, and plans to build another 162. "In two years, there will be very strong demand on the market, as new reactors start operating, and as new contracts with the existing fleet kick in," Areva SA's Chief Commercial Officer Ruben Lazo said in a previous interview.

#### But, the US is not reversing course on reprocessing.

Saillan 10 (Charles, attorney with the New Mexico Environment Department, Harvard Environmental Law Review, 2010, “DISPOSAL OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE: A PERSISTENT ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEM”, Vol. 34, RSR)

The U.S. government’s position on reprocessing changed in 1974 when India exploded a nuclear weapon in the state of Rajasthan. 150 The weapon’s plutonium was isolated with reprocessing equipment imported for “peaceful purposes.” 151 Rightly concerned about the dangers of nuclear proliferation, President Ford announced that the United States would no longer view reprocessing as a necessary step in the nuclear fuel cycle. He called on other nations to place a three-year moratorium on the export of reprocessing technology. 152 In 1977, President Carter indefinitely deferred domestic efforts at reprocessing and continued the export embargo. 153 Although President Reagan reversed the ban on domestic reprocessing in 1981, 154 the nuclear industry has not taken the opportunity to invest in the technology. In 2006, the George W. Bush Administration proposed a Global Nuclear Energy Partner ship (“GNEP”) for expanded worldwide nuclear power production. 155 As a key component of the GNEP proposal, the United States would provide other nations with a reliable supply of nuclear fuel, and it would take back the spent fuel for reprocessing at a commercial facility in the United States, thus avoiding the spread of reprocessing technology. 156 However, the Obama Administration substantially curtailed GNEP in 2009, and is “no longer pursuing domestic commercial reprocessing.” 157

### Observation 2

#### Observation Two: Russia

#### Relations with Russia are deteriorating in the SQUO – nuclear energy represents a crucial point for overcoming other alt causes.

Weitz 12 [Richard, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, World Politics Review Senior Editor, “Global Insights: U.S.-Russia Arms Control Prospects Under Putin”, World Politics Review, 3-6-2012, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11681/global-insights-u-s-russia-arms-control-prospects-under-putin]

This weekend’s election in Russia has unsurprisingly returned Vladimir Putin to the country’s presidency. In contrast to the preordained outcome of the Russian voting, the winner of this November’s U.S. presidential election is not yet known. But whoever occupies the White House in 2013 will need to consider the bilateral arms control relationship with Russia in coming years. And although the implementation of the New START agreement is going well, there are sharp differences in Washington and Moscow over where to go next. Moscow’s main concerns focus on U.S. missile defense and U.S. superiority in conventional forces. Both conditions work against Russia’s willingness to cut its offensive nuclear forces even further, which is the U.S. priority, especially with regard to the issue of Russian tactical nuclear weapons. In his recent Moscow News article on Russian foreign policy, Putin railed against what he called the U.S. quest for “absolute security.” In his words, the problem is that “absolute invulnerability for one country would in theory require absolute vulnerability for all others.” Instead, Putin again insisted on the right of all states to equal security, as well as Russia’s right to maintain the capacity to attack the United States with nuclear weapons if necessary. Putin argued that faced with U.S. plans for deploying a European-based missile defense system, Russia had two options: a symmetrical response of creating its own system or an asymmetrical strategy of strengthening Russia’s offensive strategic weapons to ensure that they are capable of overcoming any NATO system and thereby preserving mutual deterrence. The first choice being too costly and technically challenging, he said Russia would follow the second course. In Moscow’s view, the problem of equal security also applies to the imbalance in conventional forces in Europe. The United States recently followed Russia’s lead in ending implementation of the original Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. Russian officials have also given up on the idea of ratifying the Adapted CFE Treaty, since NATO insists that Russia withdraw its military forces from Georgia as part of its Istanbul Commitments. Given these complications, Russians are uninterested in various U.S. proposals for a “grand bargain” that would seek to address the CFE and tactical nuclear weapons in Europe simultaneously. Russian policymakers have also expressed a new complaint in the form of their open doubt over the United States’ ability to ratify the kinds of binding legal agreements that Moscow demands. They note the difficulties that the Obama administration had in securing U.S. Senate ratification of New START, which required a White House commitment to modernize the U.S. nuclear arsenal, even if that is now falling victim to budgetary pressures. Russians insist that they want another legally binding agreement to constrain U.S. missile defenses. The Obama administration has been offering a politically binding agreement on missile defense, but has refused to accept legally binding constraints on how the missile defense program might develop. Although U.S. officials stress that they will not try to negate Russia’s nuclear deterrent, whose massive size and great sophistication would make such an effort impossible in any case, Congress would never accept a legally binding agreement that commits the United States to deliberately constrain its ability to protect Americans and their allies from foreign missile attacks. At best, the administration is willing to offer nonbinding political guarantees that they will not seek to negate Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent. Russian officials refuse to accept mere political declarations on such important issues. They claim the United States earlier violated such agreements when it enlarged NATO after the Cold War and moved NATO forces into former Soviet-bloc states. In contrast, they note that even when the United States withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2001, the predictable and legal manner in which the withdrawal was carried out reassured Putin and others in Moscow who opposed the U.S. decision. Russians also point out that political agreements lend themselves to different interpretations depending on who is viewing the issue. Although they do not seem to worry about another Obama presidency, they claim to fear that some future U.S. administration will try to expand U.S. missile defenses to be able to intercept Russian strategic missiles. These differences highlight the uncertain climate surrounding the nuclear arms control agenda, which is compounded by Russian concerns about U.S. space, cyber and other weapons. But progress could be possible in several other areas. First, Russians are eager to help counter nuclear terrorism through the mechanisms of the Nuclear Security Summit forums and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Both countries want to revive the civilian use of nuclear power under safe and secure conditions, making sure that those countries now considering starting nuclear energy programs receive training and guidance on how to avoid accidents and protect the nuclear material at their facilities. Second, Russian-U.S. collaboration on regional proliferation challenges is important, since both countries are veto-wielding members of the U.N. Security Council. Russian officials are unlikely to accept any more U.N. sanctions on Iran given their different assessment of Iranian motives, unless incontrovertible evidence that Tehran is seeking a nuclear weapon emerges. But cooperation is possible regarding North Korea, where Russia and the United States share the goal of stabilizing the Korean Peninsula. Third, the Carnegie Endowment and other institutions have been developing a number of potential informal confidence and transparency-building measures that the two sides could pursue. These would help to lead toward a new strategic arms control treaty in a few years if the bilateral relationship improves, but could serve a valuable stabilizing function even without one. These measures include renewed efforts to expand the application of restrictions in the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty and other bilateral arms control agreements to other countries, as well as measures to increase transparency regarding the capacity of each sides’ nuclear weapons-production complexes to construct new nuclear forces in any attempt to rapidly break out of a strategic arms control agreement. Finally, Russians are eager to work on civilian nuclear energy cooperation with the United States. The two sides’ recently ratified 123 agreement allows Russian and U.S. firms to cooperate to produce new types of civilian power reactors that would be less prone to proliferation than existing models. Such collaboration could prove very useful in helping develop new commercial stakeholders in both countries that have an interest in maintaining good Russian-U.S. relations. The economic relationship between Russia and the United States remains relatively undeveloped, since Americans buy Russia’s main exports -- oil, gas and weapons -- elsewhere, while various impediments hobble mutual investments. At present, the constituencies favoring strong bilateral ties in both countries are small, consisting mainly of arms control advocates and foreign policy experts. As a result, the Russian-U.S. agenda is still dominated by Cold War-type issues, including nuclear arms control, which position the two parties in an adversarial relationship. Only by moving away from this orientation can both sides begin to overcome the mutual confidence gap that exacerbates many of their other differences. Though Putin’s return to the presidency could augur a hard line on a number of issues where the U.S. and Russian positions diverge, his pragmatism and opportunism could lead to progress in the areas where the two sides’ interests overlap.

#### Russia will say yes to cooperation over reprocessing – plan sends a key signal to move beyond the Cold War legacy.

Rojansky 10 [Matthew, deputy director Russia and Eurasia Program at Carnegie, “As New START Debate Rages, Quiet Nuclear Progress With Russia”, U.S. News and World Report, 12-9-2010, http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2010/12/09/as-new-start-debate-rages-quiet-nuclear-progress-with-russia]

Beyond benefiting relations, cooperation on peaceful nuclear energy makes financial sense. The United States and Russia have invested substantially in civilian nuclear research and development, and both share basic interests in capitalizing on the global "nuclear energy renaissance" by developing proliferation-resistant reactor technologies, increasing environmental safety, and making nuclear energy more economically competitive. And when it comes to civil nuclear power, Russia brings a lot to the table. For instance, the United States does not operate so-called "fast breeder" reactors and reprocessing facilities that don't produce nuclear waste that can be used for weapons, but Russia does. And, while the United States hasn't built a single new n uclear power plant since 1973, Russia opened its first fast breeder reactor that very year and plans to bring 26 new nuclear facilities online before 2030. And the Kremlin has already allocated some $3.6 billion for research on fast breeders and other projects under a program dedicated to the next generation of nuclear technology. With U.S. support, Russia has developed a sophisticated infrastructure to securely store spent nuclear fuel—and Moscow even offered to store and reprocess spent fuel from the United States, while no American state has been willing to do the same. Russian companies already supply roughly half of the uranium consumed in U.S. and European power plants and will need to supply more in the future as the United States is only able to produce a fifth—at most—of its nuclear fuel stock domestically. Fortunately, Russia's nuclear industry is interested in expanding its uranium enrichment and reprocessing activity in the U.S. market and potentially cooperating with American firms, including GE and Westinghouse, on bids for contracts in other countries. Closer U.S.-Russia cooperation on nuclear power means better nuclear security. As a major player in civil nuclear markets worldwide, Russia has a unique window into potential risks and opportunities to insist on measures that protect sensitive sites and technologies. Russia, with U.S. support, also has the chance to compete more effectively with China's nuclear industry, which is less scrupulous in its nonproliferation commitments. The importance of partnering with Russia was made clear during Secretary Clinton's recent trip to Central Asia. Belarus, the former Soviet republic, agreed to give up its stock of highly enriched uranium by 2012 in return for U.S. help in developing a new nuclear power reactor. But Russia has had its eye on this potentially lucrative project, and has the right experience to work effectively with Belarus's Soviet-era infrastructure. Washington should cooperate—instead of compete—with Moscow to build an environmentally safe, proliferation-proof reactor in Belarus. A quarter century after the Chernobyl disaster, this would be a powerful symbol that both sides can move beyond the Cold War legacy.

#### Relations are the biggest controlling impact – solves multiple extinction scenarios - Iran prolif, US-Russia War, terrorism, heg and economic security

Allison and Blackwill 11 (10-30-11 Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Douglas Dillon Professor of Government; Faculty Chair, Dubai Initiative, Harvard Kennedy School, Robert D. Blackwill, International Council Member, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs "10 Reasons Why Russia Still Matters"http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/21469/10\_reasons\_why\_russia\_still\_matters.html)

That central point is that Russia matters a great deal to a U.S. government seeking to defend and advance its national interests. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s decision to return next year as president makes it all the more critical for Washington to manage its relationship with Russia through coherent, realistic policies. No one denies that Russia is a dangerous, difficult, often disappointing state to do business with. We should not overlook its many human rights and legal failures. Nonetheless, Russia is a player whose choices affect our vital interests in nuclear security and energy. It is key to supplying 100,000 U.S. troops fighting in Afghanistan and preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Ten realities require U.S. policymakers to advance our nation’s interests by engaging and working with Moscow. First, Russia remains the only nation that can erase the United States from the map in 30 minutes. As every president since John F. Kennedy has recognized, Russia’s cooperation is critical to averting nuclear war. Second, Russia is our most consequential partner in preventing nuclear terrorism. Through a combination of more than $11 billion in U.S. aid, provided through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, and impressive Russian professionalism, two decades after the collapse of the “evil empire,” not one nuclear weapon has been found loose. Third, Russia plays an essential role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile-delivery systems. As Washington seeks to stop Iran’s drive toward nuclear weapons, Russian choices to sell or withhold sensitive technologies are the difference between failure and the possibility of success. Fourth, Russian support in sharing intelligence and cooperating in operations remains essential to the U.S. war to destroy Al Qaeda and combat other transnational terrorist groups. Fifth, Russia provides a vital supply line to 100,000 U.S. troops fighting in Afghanistan. As U.S. relations with Pakistan have deteriorated, the Russian lifeline has grown ever more important and now accounts for half all daily deliveries. Sixth, Russia is the world’s largest oil producer and second largest gas producer. Over the past decade, Russia has added more oil and gas exports to world energy markets than any other nation. Most major energy transport routes from Eurasia start in Russia or cross its nine time zones. As citizens of a country that imports two of every three of the 20 million barrels of oil that fuel U.S. cars daily, Americans feel Russia’s impact at our gas pumps. Seventh, Moscow is an important player in today’s international system. It is no accident that Russia is one of the five veto-wielding, permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, as well as a member of the G-8 and G-20. A Moscow more closely aligned with U.S. goals would be significant in the balance of power to shape an environment in which China can emerge as a global power without overturning the existing order. Eighth, Russia is the largest country on Earth by land area, abutting China on the East, Poland in the West and the United States across the Arctic. This territory provides transit corridors for supplies to global markets whose stability is vital to the U.S. economy. Ninth, Russia’s brainpower is reflected in the fact that it has won more Nobel Prizes for science than all of Asia, places first in most math competitions and dominates the world chess masters list. The only way U.S. astronauts can now travel to and from the International Space Station is to hitch a ride on Russian rockets. The co-founder of the most advanced digital company in the world, Google, is Russian-born Sergei Brin. Tenth, Russia’s potential as a spoiler is difficult to exaggerate. Consider what a Russian president intent on frustrating U.S. international objectives could do — from stopping the supply flow to Afghanistan to selling S-300 air defense missiles to Tehran to joining China in preventing U.N. Security Council resolutions. So next time you hear a policymaker dismissing Russia with rhetoric about “who cares?” ask them to identify nations that matter more to U.S. success, or failure, in advancing our national interests.

#### Independently, nuclear cooperation with Russia solves their economy – they want the plan.

Dewey et al 10 (Taylor, Logan Ensign, Stanford University, Natalya Matytsyna, The Higher School of Economics, Polina Beresneva, Moscow State University, Stanford U.S. Russia Forum Journal 2009-2010, <http://joinsurf.com/news/62/16/SURF-2009-2010-Journal-Article-4-of-8>)

Russia is currently pursuing the strategy of expanding its global role as an energy provider. This role will necessitate expanding the domestic production of nuclear energy as a way of freeing up fossil fuels, particularly natural gas, for export. Inherent in this strategy is the expansion of Russia’s nuclear export business to transform Rosatom into a major player in the world nuclear energy market and Russia into the default country for nuclear fuel-cycle services. Russia’s interest in concluding a nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States is grounded, in large part, in its desire to implement this strategy. Although Russia is not dependent on obtaining access to US technology and is already actively pursuing its nuclear energy goals regardless, cooperation with the US could help to render Russia’s strategy more efficient. While Russia’s nuclear industry has been far more active than its US counterpart over the past several decades, there are still gaps in the Russian nuclear engineering chain and areas where US technical expertise could improve the outlook for Russian exports. This is especially true in the area of control and safety systems, known as automated control and technical processes (ACPS). To improve their ability to pursue nuclear exports in larger, more lucrative and more internationally acceptable markets, Russian officials and industry are increasingly interested in developing joint initiatives with the United States and other countries. In the past, China and other countries have asked that some reactors purchased from Russia be equipped with non-Russian made ACPS. Partnering with German and French companies appears to have helped Russian firms win bids to build two reactors in Bulgaria. Complete control systems cannot be exported from the United States unless the recipient or partner has a 123 Agreement in place. Beyond the export market, Russian officials have expressed interest in enhancing cooperation with US companies to increase the efficiency and safety of reactors already operating in Russia. In addition, the United States has valuable expertise in the area of reactor life extension. Russia is also eager to reduce the maintenance costs of its nuclear reactor operations. According to official Russian government projections, Russia’s nuclear operators are hoping to reduce their maintenance costs by 20 percent by the year 2015. The United States nuclear industry has already reduced its maintenance costs by almost half (from 3.4 to 1.68 cents/kilowatt hour) since the mid- 1980s. The US experience may be of real value as Russia works to meet its targets.

#### Russian economic collapse causes extinction

Filger 9 (Sheldon, Author and Writer @ the Huffington Post, Former VP for Resource Development at New York’s United Way, “Russian Economy Faces Disastrous Free Fall Contraction,” http://www.globaleconomiccrisis.com/blog/archives/356)

In Russia historically, economic health and political stability are intertwined to a degree that is rarely encountered in other major industrialized economies. It was the economic stagnation of the former Soviet Union that led to its political downfall. Similarly, Medvedev and Putin, both intimately acquainted with their nation’s history, are unquestionably alarmed at the prospect that Russia’s economic crisis will endanger the nation’s political stability, achieved at great cost after years of chaos following the demise of the Soviet Union. Already, strikes and protests are occurring among rank and file workers facing unemployment or non-payment of their salaries. Recent polling demonstrates that the once supreme popularity ratings of Putin and Medvedev are eroding rapidly. Beyond the political elites are the financial oligarchs, who have been forced to deleverage, even unloading their yachts and executive jets in a desperate attempt to raise cash. Should the Russian economy deteriorate to the point where economic collapse is not out of the question, the impact will go far beyond the obvious accelerant such an outcome would be for the Global Economic Crisis. There is a geopolitical dimension that is even more relevant then the economic context. Despite its economic vulnerabilities and perceived decline from superpower status, Russia remains one of only two nations on earth with a nuclear arsenal of sufficient scope and capability to destroy the world as we know it. For that reason, it is not only President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin who will be lying awake at nights over the prospect that a national economic crisis can transform itself into a virulent and destabilizing social and political upheaval. It just may be possible that U.S. President Barack Obama’s national security team has already briefed him about the consequences of a major economic meltdown in Russia for the peace of the world. After all, the most recent national intelligence estimates put out by the U.S. intelligence community have already concluded that the Global Economic Crisis represents the greatest national security threat to the United States, due to its facilitating political instability in the world. During the years Boris Yeltsin ruled Russia, security forces responsible for guarding the nation’s nuclear arsenal went without pay for months at a time, leading to fears that desperate personnel would illicitly sell nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations. If the current economic crisis in Russia were to deteriorate much further, how secure would the Russian nuclear arsenal remain? It may be that the financial impact of the Global Economic Crisis is its least dangerous consequence.

### Observation 3

#### Observation Three: Plutonium

#### Plutonium-238 is critical to all of NASA’s power needs – studies show no other isotopes work. Plus, plutonium-238 is not being produced by any country, supplies are running low, and Congress hasn’t provided funding to restart production.

Colladay et al. 12 [Raymond (Chair Committee on NASA Space Technology Roadmaps and Priorities, Steering Committee); The committee is made up of experts in various panels to study and report on their areas of expertise, The National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, Institute of Medicine, and National Research Council are private, nonprofit institutions that provide expert advice on some of the most pressing challenges facing the nation and the world. Known collectively as the National Academies, our organization produces groundbreaking reports that have helped shape sound policies, inform public opinion, and advance the pursuit of science, engineering, and medicine; “NASA Space Technology Roadmaps and Priorities: Restoring NASA's Technological Edge and Paving the Way for a New Era in Space”; 2012; ISBN 978-0-309-25362-8;

http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record\_id=13354]

Radioisotope power systems (RPSs) provide power to scientific and human exploration missions over long¶ periods almost anywhere in the solar system and beyond. RPSs have enabled many unique deep space and planetary¶ exploration missions, making important scientific discoveries possible. RPSs used plutonium-238 (Pu-238)¶ as a heat source, and they have used thermoelectric converters since 1961 to provide reliable electrical power for¶ many missions throughout the solar system, including Pioneer, Viking, Viking landers, Galileo, Ulysses, Apollo¶ 12-17, Cassini, and New Horizons. Demonstrated mission operating lifetimes have exceeded 30 years. Future¶ RPSs could be developed to deliver both lower power levels (watts or fractions of a watt) and higher power levels¶ (hundreds of watts up to 1 kW). The higher power systems would enable radioisotope electric propulsion for deep¶ space missions, making several new classes of missions possible.¶ While RPSs have a well-established foundation, there are significant technology issues that must be overcome¶ to maximize the effectiveness of the United States’ dwindling supply of available Pu-238. DOE no longer has the¶ ability to produce Pu-238 (except for very small amounts for research), and the United States has purchased all¶ available Pu-238 from Russia. No other country, including Russia, is currently producing Pu-238, and multiple¶ studies have shown that there is no other available radioisotope material that can meet even a significant fraction¶ of NASA’s RPS needs. Supported by recent NRC studies (NRC, 2010, 2011), NASA and DOE have been attempting¶ to restart production of a limited annual quantity of Pu-238 for the past few years, but Congress has not yet¶ provided funding to the DOE and/or NASA for this purpose.3¶ NASA and DOE have been developing advanced RPSs that would use Stirling engines to replace thermoelectric¶ converters. Because the energy conversion efficiency of the Stirling engine under development is about 5 times that¶ of thermoelectric converters, Stirling engines require significantly smaller quantities of Pu-238 to achieve similar¶ power levels. Given the scarcity of Pu-238 (which will persist for years even after Pu-238 production is approved¶ and funded), the much higher efficiency of Stirling engines is necessary if RPSs are to be available for NASA’s planned science and exploration missions. As discussed in Chapter 3, establishing a reliable, recurring source of¶ Pu-238 and maturing Stirling engine technology are both critically important to provide power for NASA’s future¶ science and exploration missions that cannot rely on solar power.¶ Radioisotope technology using Stirling engines is currently assessed to be at TRL 6. Although some components¶ have been demonstrated at higher TRLs, a flight test is needed to advance beyond TRL 6. Using the ISS to¶ demonstrate this technology is not an option due to restrictions regarding operation of nuclear power systems in¶ LEO. RPS technology is somewhat unique to NASA, as interplanetary space missions are the only driving need¶ that has been identified to justify restarting Pu-238 production. NASA and DOE have the unique capabilities and¶ facilities necessary to develop RPSs. By statute, DOE must be responsible for the nuclear aspects of RPS technology¶ development. NASA Glenn Research Center has led the development of Stirling engines and the Jet Propulsion¶ Laboratory leads NASA efforts in RPS development and spacecraft integration.

#### Scenario 1 is colonization:

#### Plan allows for the only power source capable of producing steady amounts of power for long periods of time not contingent upon outside conditions – that makes us critical for every interplanetary colonization mission.

Campbell et. al 9 [Michael, M.D. Campbell and Associates, Jeffrey King, M.D. Campbell and Associates, Henry Wise, consultant, Bruce Handley, M.D. Campbell and Associates, M. David Campbell, Environmental Resources Management, “The Role of Nuclear Power in Space Exploration and the Associated Environmental Issues: An Overview”, http://www.searchanddiscovery.com/documents/2009/80053campbell/ndx\_campbell.pdf, 11/19/2009]

A space exploration mission requires power at many stages, such as the initial launch of the ¶ space vehicle and subsequent maneuvering, to run the instrumentation and communication ¶ systems, warming or cooling of vital systems, lighting, various experiments, and many more ¶ uses, especially in manned missions. To date, chemical rocket thrusters have been used ¶ exclusively for launching spacecraft into orbit and beyond. It would be tempting to believe that ¶ all power after launch could be supplied by solar energy. However, in many cases, missions will ¶ take place in areas too far from sufficient sun light, areas where large solar panels will not be ¶ appropriate. ¶ Limitations of solar power have logically lead to the development of alternative sources of power ¶ and heating. One alternative involves the use of nuclear power systems (NPSs). These rely on the ¶ use of radioisotopes and are generally referred to as radioisotope thermoelectric generators ¶ (RTGs), thermoelectric generators (TEGs), and radioisotope heat er units (RHUs). These units ¶ have been employed on both U.S. and Soviet/Russian spacecrafts for m ore than 40 years. Space ¶ exploration would not have been possible without the use of RTGs to provide electrical power ¶ and to maintain the temperatures of various components within their operational ranges (Bennett, ¶ 2006). ¶ RTGs evolved out of a simple experiment in physics. In 1812, a German scientist (named T. J . ¶ Seebeck) discovered that when two dissimilar wires are connected at two junctions, and if one ¶ junction is kept hot while the other is co ld, an electric current will flow in the circuit between ¶ them from hot to cold. Such a pair of junctions is called a thermoelectric couple. The required ¶ heat can be supplied by one of a number of radioactive isotopes. The device that converts heat to electricity has no moving parts and is, therefore, very reliable and continues for as long as the ¶ radioisotope source produces a useful level of heat. The heat production is, of course, continually ¶ decaying but radioisotopes are customized to fit the intended use of the electricity and for the ¶ planned mission duration. ¶ The IAEA report (2005a) suggests that nu clear reactors can provide almost limitless power for ¶ almost any duration. However, they are not practicable for applications below 10 kW. RTGs are ¶ best used for continuous supply of low levels (up to 5 kW) of power or in combinations up to ¶ many times this value. For this reason, especially for long interplanetary missions, the use of ¶ radioisotopes for communications and the powering of experiments are preferred. For short ¶ durations of up to a few hours, chemical fuels can provide energy of up to 60,000 kW, but for ¶ mission durations of a month use is limited to a kilowatt or less. Although solar power is an ¶ advanced form of nuclear power, this source of energy diffuses with distance from the Sun and ¶ does not provide the often needed rapid surges of large amounts of energy.

#### Extinction is inevitable if we don’t get off the rock—multiple scenarios.

Austen 11 [Ben, contributing editor of Harper’s Magazine, “After Earth: Why, Where, How, and When We Might Leave Our Home Planet,” popular science, http://www.popsci.com/science/article/2011-02/after-earth-why-where-how-and-when-we-might-leave-our-home-planet?page=3]

Earth won’t always be fit for occupation. We know that in two billion years or so, an expanding sun will boil away our oceans, leaving our home in the universe uninhabitable—unless, that is, we haven’t already been wiped out by the Andromeda galaxy, which is on a multibillion-year collision course with our Milky Way. Moreover, at least a third of the thousand mile-wide asteroids that hurtle across our orbital path will eventually crash into us, at a rate of about one every 300,000 years. Why? Indeed, in 1989 a far smaller asteroid, the impact of which would still have been equivalent in force to 1,000 nuclear bombs, crossed our orbit just six hours after Earth had passed. A recent report by the Lifeboat Foundation, whose hundreds of researchers track a dozen different existential risks to humanity, likens that one-in-300,000 chance of a catastrophic strike to a game of Russian roulette: “If we keep pulling the trigger long enough we’ll blow our head off, and there’s no guarantee it won’t be the next pull.” Many of the threats that might lead us to consider off-Earth living arrangements are actually man-made, and not necessarily in the distant future. The amount we consume each year already far outstrips what our planet can sustain, and the World Wildlife Fund estimates that by 2030 we will be consuming two planets’ worth of natural resources annually. The Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters, an international humanitarian organization, reports that the onslaught of droughts, earthquakes, epic rains and floods over the past decade is triple the number from the 1980s and nearly 54 times that of 1901, when this data was first collected. Some scenarios have climate change leading to severe water shortages, the submersion of coastal areas, and widespread famine. Additionally, the world could end by way of deadly pathogen, nuclear war or, as the Lifeboat Foundation warns, the “misuse of increasingly powerful technologies.” Given the risks humans pose to the planet, we might also someday leave Earth simply to conserve it, with our planet becoming a kind of nature sanctuary that we visit now and again, as we might Yosemite. None of the threats we face are especially far-fetched. Climate change is already a major factor in human affairs, for instance, and our planet has undergone at least one previous mass extinction as a result of asteroid impact. “The dinosaurs died out because they were too stupid to build an adequate spacefaring civilization,” says Tihamer Toth-Fejel, a research engineer at the Advanced Information Systems division of defense contractor General Dynamics and one of 85 members of the Lifeboat Foundation’s space-settlement board. “So far, the difference between us and them is barely measurable.” The Alliance to Rescue Civilization, a project started by New York University chemist Robert Shapiro, contends that the inevitability of any of several cataclysmic events means that we must prepare a copy of our civilization and move it into outer space and out of harm’s way—a backup of our cultural achievements and traditions. In 2005, then–NASA administrator Michael Griffin described the aims of the national space program in similar terms. “If we humans want to survive for hundreds of thousands or millions of years, we must ultimately populate other planets,” he said. “One day, I don’t know when that day is, but there will be more human beings who live off the Earth than on it.”

#### Scenario two is hegemony:

#### No plutonium means no space missions – that devastates NASA leadership and credibility and creates a “lost generation” of planetary scientists.

Jones 11 [Richard M., American Institute of Physics; “AIP Supports Resumption of Pu-238 Production”; FYI: The AIP Bulletin of Science Policy News, Number 81 - July 5, 2011;

http://www.aip.org/fyi/2011/081.html]

Pu-238 is a non-weapons grade form of plutonium needed to provide power to spacecraft in areas of space where solar energy is not sufficient. Pu-238 has been the enabling technology for robotic space exploration for two generations, and has led to truly transformative discoveries by such notable satellite missions as Voyager (grand tour from Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, Neptune), Viking (Mars surface landers in the 1970s), and Galileo (Jupiter), Casinni (Saturn), and New Horizons (Pluto and the Kuiper Belt).¶ There is no viable alternative to power deep space missions, and no U.S. source is currently available. Since U.S. production ceased, our diminishing stockpile of plutonium-238 has largely been purchased from Russia, but any additional purchase is currently being held up in ongoing negotiations.¶ Without Pu-238, NASA cannot carry out future deep space planetary missions. Pu-238 permits the U.S. to envision and then pursue space exploration objectives that would not otherwise be possible. The possibility to study, plan, and pursue such objectives will keep our country on the cutting edge of solar system exploration. Without Pu-238, the creativity of U.S. researchers will be seriously constrained as they study future robotic exploration. And even if Pu-238 production starts immediately, there will still be a five-year delay to have enough Pu-238 for a spacecraft; this delay will push back at least twelve proposed planetary space missions that require Pu-238. A delay could cause missions to reach prohibitively high costs, which could cause job losses – including a lost generation of young U.S. planetary scientists and engineers, diminish U.S. leadership in planetary science, and prevent us from expanding knowledge of the universe.¶ For several years the scientific community has been calling for the restart of production of Pu-238 and now time is running out. The 2009 National Academies report, ‘Radioisotope Power Systems: An Imperative for Maintaining U.S. Leadership in Space Exploration,’ stated that there is an immediate need to fund activities to restart domestic production of Pu-238. Furthermore, the 2011 planetary sciences decadal survey, a community consensus report on priorities for federal support, reaffirmed, “Without a restart of Pu-238 production, it will be impossible for the United States, or any other country, to conduct certain important types of planetary missions after this decade.”

#### Setting the precedent in space is key to US hegemony.

Stone 11 [Christopher, space policy analyst and strategist who lives near Washington DC, 3/14/11, “American Leadership in space : leadership through capability”,

http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1797/1]

First, let me start by saying that I agree with Mr. Friedman’s assertion that “American leadership is a phrase we hear bandied about a lot in political circles in the United States, as well as in many space policy discussions.” I have been at many space forums in my career where I’ve heard the phrase used by speakers of various backgrounds, political ideologies, and nation. Like Mr. Friedman states, “it has many different meanings, most derived from cultural or political biases, some of them contradictory”. This is true: many nations, as well as organizations and individuals worldwide, have different preferences and views as to what American leadership in space is, and/or what it should be. He also concludes that paragraph by stating that American leadership in space could also be viewed as “synonymous with American… hegemony”. I again will agree that some people within the United Stats and elsewhere have this view toward American leadership. However, just because people believe certain viewpoints regarding American leadership does not mean that those views are accurate assessments or definitions of what actions demonstrate US leadership in the space medium.¶ When it comes to space exploration and development, including national security space and commercial, I would disagree somewhat with Mr. Friedman’s assertion that space is “often” overlooked in “foreign relations and geopolitical strategies”. My contention is that while space is indeed overlooked in national grand geopolitical strategies by many in national leadership, space is used as a tool for foreign policy and relations more often than not. In fact, I will say that the US space program has become less of an effort for the advancement of US space power and exploration, and is used more as a foreign policy tool to “shape” the strategic environment to what President Obama referred to in his National Security Strategy as “The World We Seek”. Using space to shape the strategic environment is not a bad thing in and of itself. What concerns me with this form of “shaping” is that we appear to have changed the definition of American leadership as a nation away from the traditional sense of the word. Some seem to want to base our future national foundations in space using the important international collaboration piece as the starting point. Traditional national leadership would start by advancing United States’ space power capabilities and strategies first, then proceed toward shaping the international environment through allied cooperation efforts. The United States’ goal should be leadership through spacefaring capabilities, in all sectors. Achieving and maintaining such leadership through capability will allow for increased space security and opportunities for all and for America to lead the international space community by both technological and political example. The world has recognized America as the leaders in space because it demonstrated technological advancement by the Apollo lunar landings, our deep space exploration probes to the outer planets, and deploying national security space missions. We did not become the recognized leaders in astronautics and space technology because we decided to fund billions into research programs with no firm budgetary commitment or attainable goals. We did it because we made a national level decision to do each of them, stuck with it, and achieved exceptional things in manned and unmanned spaceflight. We have allowed ourselves to drift from this traditional strategic definition of leadership in space exploration, rapidly becoming participants in spaceflight rather than the leader of the global space community. One example is shutting down the space shuttle program without a viable domestic spacecraft chosen and funded to commence operations upon retirement of the fleet. We are paying millions to rely on Russia to ferry our astronauts to an International Space Station that US taxpayers paid the lion’s share of the cost of construction. Why would we, as United States citizens and space advocates, settle for this? The current debate on commercial crew and cargo as the stopgap between shuttle and whatever comes next could and hopefully will provide some new and exciting solutions to this particular issue. However, we need to made a decision sooner rather than later.

#### Heg solves nuclear escalation and global nuclear arms races- other states won’t deter effectively.

Brooks et al. 13 [STEPHEN G. BROOKS is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College.¶ G. JOHN IKENBERRY is Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul.¶ WILLIAM C. WOHLFORTH is Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. “Lean Forward,” EBSCO]

KEEPING THE PEACE¶ Of course, even if it is true that the costs of deep engagement fall far below what advocates of retrenchment claim, they would not be worth bearing unless they yielded greater benefits. In fact, they do. The most obvious benefit of the current strategy is that it reduces the risk of a dangerous conflict. The United States' security commitments deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and dissuade U.S. partners from trying to solve security problems on their own in ways that would end up threatening other states.¶ Skeptics discount this benefit by arguing that U.S. security guarantees aren't necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries from erupting. They maintain that the high costs of territorial conquest and the many tools countries can use to signal their benign intentions are enough to prevent conflict. In other words, major powers could peacefully manage regional multipolarity without the American pacifier.¶ But that outlook is too sanguine. If Washington got out of East Asia, Japan and South Korea would likely expand their military capabilities and go nuclear, which could provoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It's worth noting that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan tried to obtain nuclear weapons; the only thing that stopped them was the United States, which used its security commitments to restrain their nuclear temptations. Similarly, were the United States to leave the Middle East, the countries currently backed by Washington--notably, Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia--might act in ways that would intensify the region's security dilemmas.¶ There would even be reason to worry about Europe. Although it's hard to imagine the return of great-power military competition in a post-American Europe, it's not difficult to foresee governments there refusing to pay the budgetary costs of higher military outlays and the political costs of increasing EU defense cooperation. The result might be a continent incapable of securing itself from threats on its periphery, unable to join foreign interventions on which U.S. leaders might want European help, and vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers.¶ Given how easily a U.S. withdrawal from key regions could lead to dangerous competition, advocates of retrenchment tend to put forth another argument: that such rivalries wouldn't actually hurt the United States. To be sure, few doubt that the United States could survive the return of conflict among powers in Asia or the Middle East--but at what cost? Were states in one or both of these regions to start competing against one another, they would likely boost their military budgets, arm client states, and perhaps even start regional proxy wars, all of which should concern the United States, in part because its lead in military capabilities would narrow.¶ Greater regional insecurity could also produce cascades of nuclear proliferation as powers such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan built nuclear forces of their own. Those countries' regional competitors might then also seek nuclear arsenals. Although nuclear deterrence can promote stability between two states with the kinds of nuclear forces that the Soviet Union and the United States possessed, things get shakier when there are multiple nuclear rivals with less robust arsenals. As the number of nuclear powers increases, the probability of illicit transfers, irrational decisions, accidents, and unforeseen crises goes up.¶ The case for abandoning the United States' global role misses the underlying security logic of the current approach. By reassuring allies and actively managing regional relations, Washington dampens competition in the world’s key areas, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse in which countries would grow new military capabilities. For proof that this strategy is working, one need look no further than the defense budgets of the current great powers: on average, since 1991 they have kept their military expenditures as A percentage of GDP to historic lows, and they have not attempted to match the United States' top-end military capabilities. Moreover, all of the world's most modern militaries are U.S. allies, and the United States' military lead over its potential rivals is by many measures growing.¶ On top of all this, the current grand strategy acts as a hedge against the emergence regional hegemons. Some supporters of retrenchment argue that the U.S. military should keep its forces over the horizon and pass the buck to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing rising regional powers. Washington, they contend, should deploy forces abroad only when a truly credible contender for regional hegemony arises, as in the cases of Germany and Japan during World War II and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Yet there is already a potential contender for regional hegemony--China--and to balance it, the United States will need to maintain its key alliances in Asia and the military capacity to intervene there. The implication is that the United States should get out of Afghanistan and Iraq, reduce its military presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia. Yet that is exactly what the Obama administration is doing.

#### Every academic discipline confirms the centrality of hegemony as a guarantor of peace.

**Wohlforth 9** [Professor of government @ Dartmouth College. [[William C. Wohlforth](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#back), “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,” World Politics, Volume 61, Number 1, January 2009]

Second, **I question the dominant view that status quo evaluations are relatively independent of the distribution of capabilities**. **If the status of states depends** in some measure **on** their **relative capabilities**, and if states derive utility from status, **then different distributions of capabilities** may **affect** levels of **satisfaction**, just as different income distributions may affect levels of status competition in domestic settings. [6](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#f6) **Building on research in psychology and sociology**, **I argue that even capabilities distributions among major powers foster ambiguous status hierarchies, which generate** more **dissatisfaction and clashes** over the status quo. And the more stratified the distribution of capabilities, the less likely such status competition is. **Unipolarity thus generates far fewer** **incentives** than either bipolarity or multipolarity **for direct great power positional competition** over status. Elites in the other major powers continue to prefer higher status, but in a unipolar system they face comparatively weak incentives to translate that preference into costly action. And the absence of such incentives matters because **social status is a positional good—something whose value depends on how much one has in relation to others**.[7](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#f7) “**If everyone has high status**,” Randall Schweller notes, “**no one does**.”[8](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#f8) While one actor might increase its status, all cannot simultaneously do so. **High status is thus inherently scarce, and competitions for status tend to be zero sum**.[9](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#f9) I begin by describing the puzzles facing predominant theories that status competition might solve. **Building on recent research on social identity and status seeking, I** then **show that** under certain conditions **the ways decision makers identify with the states they represent may prompt them to frame issues as positional disputes over status in a social hierarchy**. I develop hypotheses that tailor this scholarship to the domain of great power politics, showing how **the probability of status competition is likely to be linked to polarity**. The rest of the article investigates whether there is sufficient evidence for these hypotheses to warrant further refinement and testing. I pursue this in three ways: by showing that **the theory advanced here is consistent with** what we know about **large-scale patterns of great power conflict through history**; by [End Page 30] demonstrating that the causal mechanisms it identifies did drive relatively secure major powers to military conflict in the past (and therefore that they might do so again if the world were bipolar or multipolar); and by showing that observable evidence concerning the major powers’ identity politics and grand strategies under unipolarity are consistent with the theory’s expectations. Puzzles of Power and War Recent research on the connection between the distribution of capabilities and war has concentrated on a hypothesis long central to systemic theories of power transition or hegemonic stability: that **major war arises out of a power shift in favor of a rising state dissatisfied with a status quo defended by a declining satisfied state**.[10](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#f10) Though they have garnered substantial empirical support, these theories have yet to solve two intertwined empirical and theoretical puzzles—each of which might be explained by positional concerns for status. First, if the material costs and benefits of a given status quo are what matters, why would a state be dissatisfied with the very status quo that had abetted its rise? The rise of China today naturally prompts this question, but it is hardly a novel situation. Most of the best known and most consequential power transitions in history featured rising challengers that were prospering mightily under the status quo. In case after case, historians argue that these revisionist powers sought recognition and standing rather than specific alterations to the existing rules and practices that constituted the order of the day. In each paradigmatic case of hegemonic war, the claims of the rising power are hard to reduce to instrumental adjustment of the status quo. In R. Ned Lebow’s reading, for example, Thucydides’ account tells us that the rise of Athens posed unacceptable threats not to the security or welfare of Sparta but rather to its identity as leader of the Greek world, which was an important cause of the Spartan assembly’s vote for war.[11](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#f11) The issues that inspired Louis XIV’s and Napoleon’s dissatisfaction with the status quo were many and varied, but most accounts accord [End Page 31] independent importance to the drive for a position of unparalleled primacy. In these and other hegemonic struggles among leading states in post-Westphalian Europe, the rising challenger’s dissatisfaction is often difficult to connect to the material costs and benefits of the status quo, and much contemporary evidence revolves around issues of recognition and status.[12](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#f12) Wilhemine Germany is a fateful case in point. As Paul Kennedy has argued, underlying material trends as of 1914 were set to propel Germany’s continued rise indefinitely, so long as Europe remained at peace.[13](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#f13) Yet Germany chafed under the very status quo that abetted this rise and its elite focused resentment on its chief trading partner—the great power that presented the least plausible threat to its security: Great Britain. At fantastic cost, it built a battleship fleet with no plausible strategic purpose other than to stake a claim on global power status.[14](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#f14) Recent historical studies present strong evidence that, far from fearing attacks from Russia and France, German leaders sought to provoke them, knowing that this would lead to a long, expensive, and sanguinary war that Britain was certain to join.[15](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#f15) And of all the motivations swirling round these momentous decisions, no serious historical account fails to register German leaders’ oft-expressed yearning for “a place in the sun.” The second puzzle is bargaining failure. Hegemonic theories tend to model war as a conflict over the status quo without specifying precisely what the status quo is and what flows of benefits it provides to states.[16](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#f16) Scholars generally follow Robert Gilpin in positing that the underlying issue concerns a “desire to redraft the rules by which relations among nations work,” “the nature and governance of the system,” and “the distribution of territory among the states in the system.”[17](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#f17) If these are the [End Page 32] issues at stake, then systemic theories of hegemonic war and power transition confront the puzzle brought to the fore in a seminal article by James Fearon: what prevents states from striking a bargain that avoids the costs of war? [18](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#f18) Why can’t states renegotiate the international order as underlying capabilities distributions shift their relative bargaining power? Fearon proposed that one answer consistent with strict rational choice assumptions is that such bargains are infeasible when the issue at stake is indivisible and cannot readily be portioned out to each side. **Most aspects of a given international order are readily divisible**, however, and, as Fearon stressed, “both the intrinsic complexity and richness of most matters over which states negotiate and the availability of linkages and side-payments suggest that intermediate bargains typically will exist.”[19](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#f19) Thus, most scholars have assumed that the indivisibility problem is trivial, focusing on two other rational choice explanations for bargaining failure: uncertainty and the commitment problem.[20](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#f20) In the view of many scholars, it is these problems, rather than indivisibility, that likely explain leaders’ inability to avail themselves of such intermediate bargains. Yet **recent research inspired by constructivism shows how issues that are physically divisible can become socially indivisible, depending on how they relate to the identities of decision makers**.[21](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#f21) **Once issues** surrounding the status quo **are framed in positional terms as bearing on the disputants’ relative standing, then**, to the extent that they value their standing itself, **they may be unwilling to pursue intermediate bargaining solutions**. **Once linked to status, easily divisible issues** that theoretically provide opportunities for linkages and side payments of various sorts **may** themselves **be** seen as indivisible and thus **unavailable as avenues for** possible intermediate **bargains**. **The historical record surrounding major wars is rich with evidence suggesting that positional concerns over status frustrate bargaining**: expensive, **protracted conflict over** what appear to be **minor issues**; a propensity on the part of **decision makers** to **frame issues in terms of relative rank even when doing so makes bargaining harder**; **decision-makers’** [End Page 33] **inability to accept feasible divisions** of the matter in dispute **even when failing to do so imposes high costs**; demands on the part of states for observable evidence to confirm their estimate of an improved position in the hierarchy; **the inability** of private bargains **to resolve issues**; a frequently observed compulsion for the public attainment of concessions from a higher ranked state; and **stubborn resistance** on the part of states to which such demands are addressed **even when acquiescence entails limited material cost**. The literature on bargaining failure in the context of power shifts remains inconclusive, and it is premature to take any empirical pattern as necessarily probative. Indeed, Robert Powell has recently proposed that indivisibility is not a rationalistic explanation for war after all: fully rational leaders with perfect information should prefer to settle a dispute over an indivisible issue by resorting to a lottery rather than a war certain to destroy some of the goods in dispute. What might prevent such bargaining solutions is not indivisibility itself, he argues, but rather the parties’ inability to commit to abide by any agreement in the future if they expect their relative capabilities to continue to shift.[22](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#f22) This is the credible commitment problem to which many theorists are now turning their attention. But how it relates to the information problem that until recently dominated the formal literature remains to be seen.[23](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#f23) The larger point is that positional concerns for status may help account for the puzzle of bargaining failure. In the rational choice bargaining literature, war is puzzling because it destroys some of the benefits or flows of benefits in dispute between the bargainers, who would be better off dividing the spoils without war. Yet what happens to these models if what matters for states is less the flows of material benefits themselves than their implications for relative status? The salience of this question depends on the relative importance of positional concern for status among states. Do Great Powers Care about Status? **Mainstream theories generally posit that states come to blows** over an international status quo **only when it has implications for their security** or material well-being. The guiding assumption is that a state’s satisfaction [End Page 34] with its place in the existing order is a function of the material costs and benefits implied by that status.[24](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#f24) By that assumption, once a state’s status in an international order ceases to affect its material wellbeing, its relative standing will have no bearing on decisions for war or peace. **But the assumption is undermined by cumulative research in disciplines ranging from neuroscience** and **evolutionary biology** to **economics, anthropology, sociology, and psychology that human beings are powerfully motivated by the desire for favorable social status comparisons**. **This research suggests that the preference for status is a basic disposition rather than merely a strategy for attaining other goals**.[25](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#f25) **People often seek tangibles** not so much because of the welfare or security they bring but because of the social status they confer. Under certain conditions, **the search for status will cause people to behave in ways that directly contradict their material interest in security and**/or **prosperity**. Pg. 33-35//1ac

#### Reprocessing solves Pu-238 shortages.

Packard 12 [Steven, member of the James Randi Educational Foundation, “The U.S. Space Program’s Plutonium-238 Crisis”, Depleted Cranium, 1-6-2012, http://depletedcranium.com/americas-plutonium-238-crisis/]

The plutonium that can be extracted from light water spent fuel contains significant amounts of plutonium-238, but it’s combined with other isotopes of plutonium, making it unusable. Separating out the plutonium-238 would require a complex plutonium enrichment system, which is far less practical than simply preparing the plutonium-238 on its own.¶ To produce plutonium-238, the first thing that is required is neptunium-237. Neptunium-237 is produced as a byproduct of the reprocessing of spent fuel. When a nucleus of uranium-235 absorbs a neutron, it will usually fission. However, in a thermal spectrum reactor, some of the uranium-235 (about 18%) will absorb a neutron and not fission. Instead, the uranium-235 becomes uranium-236. Uranium-236 has a low neutron cross-section, so most of the uranium-236 generated in a reactor will just remain uranium-236, but a small amount of it does absorb a neutron and become uranium-237. Uranium-237 has a very short half-life of only six days, decaying to neptunium-237. Another source of neptunium-237 in spent fuel is the alpha decay or americium-241. Spent fuel contains about .7 grams of np-237 for every one hundred kilograms of fuel. That might not seem like much, but fuel reprocessing operations routinely go through hundreds of tons of fuel. Because Np-237 is the only isotope of neptunium present in spent fuel in any significant quantity, it does not require any enrichment. Instead, simply chemically separating the neptunium out yields nearly 100% neptunium-237.¶ After removing the neptunium-237, it is fabricated into targets which are irradiated with neutrons in a high flux reactor. The targets are then removed and processed to separate out the plutonium-238 that is produced. The plutonium-238 is then fabricated into RTG fuel tablets.¶ The United States ended the practice of spent fuel reprocessing in 1977 when it was banned by the Carter Administration because of “proliferation concerns.” Since then, the ban has been lifted, but as all reprocessing operations were shut down in the 1970’s and little support can be found for restarting the practice, the US still has no capacity to reprocess spent fuel. After 1977, some material from plutonium production reactors continued, which yielded some neptunium-237, but that also ended in 1992, with the end of the cold war.¶ Today, the United States reprocesses no fuel at all and therefore cannot produce any neptunium-237. There may still be some of the material remaining, though it’s doubtful that very much is left. It should still be possible to obtain Np-237, purchasing it from countries with major spent fuel reprocessing programs, such as Russia, France or Japan. However, this depends entirely on the willingness of such nations to provide it and may be expensive, since additional steps beyond normal reprocessing are required to produce the highly concentrated neptunium necessary for plutonium-238 production.

### Plan Text

#### Thus the plan: The United States Federal Government should provide a twenty-percent investment tax credit for the deployment of domestic nuclear fuel recycling.

### Solvency

#### Observation Four: Solvency

#### Tax incentives would solve for reprocessing – makes it commercially more desirable

Lagus 5 (Todd, 2005 WISE Intern, University of Minnesota, WISE, “Reprocessing of Spent Nuclear Fuel: A Policy Analysis” <http://www.wise-intern.org/journal/2005/lagus.pdf>, RSR)

The economic analysis shows that the reprocessing or even the once through nuclear cycle is not yet economically desirable to investors. However, changes in government policies, including environmental regulations already mentioned and economic policies, could improve the competitiveness of both technologies. The University of Chicago nuclear power study analyzes the effects of government involvement in the future of the once through cycle using several different forms of support: loan guarantees, accelerated depreciation, and investment tax credits. Loan guarantees in this case refer to the obligation of the government to repay part of the loan should a utility company not be able to repay. The 2005 Energy Bill, which passed in July 2005, would make advanced nuclear power plants eligible for federal loan guarantees and provide a tax credit for nuclear power production. This would lessen the risks associated with capital costs for investors, and according to the Chicago study, reduce the LCOE for a nuclear reactor by 4 mills/kWh to 6 mills/kWh. The next financial subject, accelerated depreciation, refers to the ability of an investor to utilize the investment tax deductions early on in the lifetime of the payment rather than receive the same deduction each year in a linear fashion. Accelerated depreciation helps investors absorb capital costs, which for nuclear power generation are large. The University of Chicago study calculates a reduction in the LCOE for a 7 year depreciation policy of 3 mills/kWh to 4 mills/kWh. Tax incentives for nuclear power production are the final policies that could make nuclear power and reprocessing more desirable. An investment tax credit of 10 percent would create an LCOE reduction between 6 mills/kWh and 8 mills/kWh, while a 20 percent credit could create cost reductions between 9 mills/kWh and 13 mills/kWh. 39 Production tax credits on a per kWh basis may also be used. Since reprocessing and the once through cycle are not appreciably different for the price, it is sufficient to assume 12 that similar effects for all three of these government policies would occur with policies applied to reprocessing. While it is no secret that monetary incentives would help the nuclear reprocessing investments, there is still the question of whether or not the government should provide economic support to the industry. As with any government funding, it is politically important not to be viewed by other energy generation industries, i.e. gas and coal, as favoring nuclear power over other sources. Given the recent concerns for global warming, tax incentives and loan guarantees for nuclear technologies seem like a realistic option especially in the absence of emission regulations. Accelerated depreciation also is an unobtrusive option that could help the industry by easing capital costs.

#### Government investment key – necessary to mitigate risks from government regulations.

Selyukh 10 (Alina, Staff Writer, “Nuclear waste issue could be solved, if...”, 8-17-10, Reuters,

<http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/08/17/us-nuclear-waste-recycling-idUSTRE67G0NM20100817>, RSR)

Since the U.S. agency declared spent fuel reprocessing too costly, U.S. research into new technologies has slowed. President George W. Bush offered federal backing for nuclear waste management alternatives, but over the years the policy has meandered and had few incentives to lure companies, said Steven Kraft, senior director of used-fuel management at the Nuclear Energy Institute, the industry's trade organization. Being able to burn through rather inexpensive uranium to produce energy, companies are wary of investing millions into recycling technology that may go against the national policy. Still, industry support for the ideas is strong, if not for the procedure itself then for allowing the market -- not the government -- to determine its cost-effectiveness and fate. Duke Energy, which operates seven nuclear plants, would support nuclear recycling if there was a cost-effective national policy, spokeswoman Rita Sipe said. GE Hitachi has proposed a new generation of fast reactors that, they say, could return to the grid up to 99 percent of energy contained in the uranium, compared to recovering 2 or 3 percent from a common light water reactor. But they want federal support for more research and, ultimately, commercialization of the technology, said chief consulting engineer Erik Loewen. That support, in essence, would have to come in a form of subsidies such as cost sharing or loan guarantees, said Jack Spencer, nuclear energy policy research fellow at the Heritage Foundation think tank. "What the industry needs... is something to mitigate government-imposed risks," he said of the regulatory regime.

#### Government investment necessary – provides appropriate risk mitigation and shortens the timeframe for completion.

IAEA 8 (International Atomic Energy Agency, “Spent Fuel Reprocessing Options”, August 2008, RSR)

With the expected high costs and significant risks involved in constructing new nuclear facilities, e.g., reprocessing facilities, the impact of various ownership options need to be considered. These options include government funding, regulated funding, private funding, and combinations of public and private funding. These different funding approaches may significantly impact the costs of fuel cycle services. Given the very long time frames associated with building reprocessing facilities, there exist risks other than technological or economic, which need to be dealt with. These include evolving government policy, public and political acceptance, and licensing risks. As a result, private investors are unlikely to provide capital unless the initial high risks factors are mitigated through appropriate risk sharing agreements (e.g., loan guarantees, equity protection plans, tax credits, etc.) with government entities.

## 2AC

### T – Tax Credit

#### We meet: Financial incentives fall under three categories – grants, loans and tax incentives.

BASE, No Date, Business Alliance for Sustainable Energy, 3EStrategies, “A Guide to U.S. Federal, Oregon, and Local Financial Incentives Available to Firms Engaged in Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency,” <http://www.3estrategies.org/Documents/IncentivesforSEcompaniesguide--3-06_000.pdf>

U.S. FEDERAL LEVEL FINANCIAL INCENTIVES. Assistance is available in the following forms: grants, loans (typically, loan guarantees), and tax incentives (in the form of tax credits or special tax deductions). The government also buys goods and services through procurement contracts. In the renewable energy/energy field, the federal departments or agencies most frequently involved include: the Small Business Administration (SBA), the Department of Energy (DOE), the Department of Agriculture (USDA). The federal government also makes funds available to state governments; see the “state-level incentives” section of this guide for further information.

#### Counter Interpretation: Financial incentives are committed funds directly tied to production

Webb, 93 – lecturer in the Faculty of Law at the University of Ottawa (Kernaghan, “Thumbs, Fingers, and Pushing on String: Legal Accountability in the Use of Federal Financial Incentives”, 31 Alta. L. Rev. 501 (1993) Hein Online)

In this paper, "financial incentives" are taken to mean disbursements 18 of public funds or contingent commitments to individuals and organizations, intended to encourage, support or induce certain behaviours in accordance with express public policy objectives. They take the form of grants, contributions, repayable contributions, loans, loan guarantees and insurance, subsidies, procurement contracts and tax expenditures.19 Needless to say, the ability of government to achieve desired behaviour may vary with the type of incentive in use: up-front disbursements of funds (such as with contributions and procurement contracts) may put government in a better position to dictate the terms upon which assistance is provided than contingent disbursements such as loan guarantees and insurance. In some cases, the incentive aspects of the funding come from the conditions attached to use of the monies.20 In others, the mere existence of a program providing financial assistance for a particular activity (eg. low interest loans for a nuclear power plant, or a pulp mill) may be taken as government approval of that activity, and in that sense, an incentive to encourage that type of activity has been created.21 Given the wide variety of incentive types, it will not be possible in a paper of this length to provide anything more than a cursory discussion of some of the main incentives used.22 And, needless to say, the comments made herein concerning accountability apply to differing degrees depending upon the type of incentive under consideration. By limiting the definition of financial incentives to initiatives where public funds are either disbursed or contingently committed, a large number of regulatory programs with incentive ***effects*** which exist, but in which no money is forthcoming,23 are excluded from direct examination in this paper. Such programs might be referred to as indirect incentives. Through elimination of indirect incentives from the scope of discussion, the definition of the incentive instrument becomes both more manageable and more particular. Nevertheless, it is possible that much of the approach taken here may be usefully applied to these types of indirect incentives as well.24 Also excluded from discussion here are social assistance programs such as welfare and ad hoc industry bailout initiatives because such programs are not designed primarily to encourage behaviours in furtherance of specific public policy objectives. In effect, these programs are assistance, but they are not incentives.

#### We meet the counter interpretation: Tax credits fall under the tax expenditure category of Webb’s definition.

CAP, ‘10

[Center for American Progress, “Tax Expenditures 101: What They Are and How They Slip Under the Radar”,

<http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/tax-reform/report/2010/04/15/7638/tax-expenditures-101/>, RSR]

Tax expenditures are, quite simply, spending programs implemented through the tax code. These programs give people and businesses special tax credits, deductions, exclusions, exemptions, deferrals, and preferential rates in support of various government policies. Some of these programs help people save for retirement, buy a home, or pay for college; others encourage companies to invest in green energy technologies or build nuclear power plants; they even subsidize corporations that drill for oil or purchase real estate; and much more. The government uses both tax expenditures and direct spending to support its policies. Direct spending is when the government takes taxpayer dollars and gives them to others to spend for a specific purpose. The government uses tax expenditures to accomplish the same goals as direct spending, but it transfers money by lowering taxes for an individual or company instead of giving them the money.

#### Reasons to prefer:

#### Limits – our interpretation limits financial incentives to measures that only have the direct and immediate of effect of energy production. It eliminates non-financial and indirect incentives that may effectually result in energy production like subsidies for R&D, a carbon tax, or renewable portfolio standards.

#### Ground – Our interpretation makes miniscule affirmatives impossible and guarantees links to spending, politics, Ks and counterplans that directly relate to energy production.

#### Their interp is bad:

#### Competing interpretations are bad: Race to the bottom: they’re just trying to limit out one more case

#### Prefer reasonability: as long as we’re reasonably topical, there’s no reason to pull the trigger. Don’t vote on potential abuse.

### Russia

#### Price collapse inevitable – meaning nuclear cooperation of aff is only way to survive.

Paikin, Columnist for Canada’s iPolitics and contributes research on international affairs to several Washington-based think tanks and institutes, ‘12

[Zach, “Coping in an increasingly competitive global economy”, http://www.ipolitics.ca/2012/04/11/zach-paikin-coping-with-less-revenues-in-an-increasingly-competitive-global-economy/]

It gets worse. The price of oil is about to collapse due to the increasing extraction of unconventional oil. Roughly 250 billion barrels of oil shale — and possibly as much as twice that figure — have been discovered in Israel and will begin to flow into the global market in about a decade at an estimated $30-40 per barrel, merely one third of the current price of oil. This gives Israel the third largest oil shale reserves in the world after the United States and China. The U.S. has already become a net exporter of gasoline and could surpass both Russia and Saudi Arabia as the world’s largest supplier of oil in the near future thanks to its unconventional oil reserves.¶ The upcoming decline in the price of oil will result in the near-total collapse of non-diversified economies, such as the Middle East’s oil-exporting countries. For instance, roughly 75 per cent of Saudi Arabia’s governmental revenue and 90 per cent of its export earnings come from the oil industry. Natural gas doesn’t provide these Mid-East states with much solace: Canadian exports of natural gas to the United States last year alone accounted for half the rate of all natural gas exports from the Middle East and North Africa.

#### Nuclear power doesn’t tradeoff with oil, but prices are volatile so impact is triggered anyway.

Nitikin, et al., ‘12

[Mary (Coordinator and Specialist in Nonproliferation at CRS); Anthony Andrews (Specialist in Energy and Defense Policy at the CRS; and Mark Holt (Specialist in Energy Policy at CRS), “Managing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Policy Implications of Expanding Global Access to Nuclear Power”, Congressional Research Service, 10-19-12, RSR]

Volatile prices for oil and natural gas are a fundamental factor in national energy policymaking. Average world prices for a barrel of oil rose from below $10 at the beginning of 1999 to above $130 in mid-2008. They then declined to around $50 in early 2009 and rose to around $100 through mid-2012. 5 U.S. natural gas prices have been similarly volatile, although falling sharply in 2012 with increased production from shale formations. 6 To reduce their vulnerability to oil and gas price swings, national governments are searching for alternative energy sources, often including nuclear power. However, only 21% of the world’s electricity generation is fueled by natural gas and 5% by oil, 7 so nuclear power’s ability to directly substitute for oil and gas is limited, at least in the near term.

#### Global movement to renewables now should have triggered the link.

Bapna, Interim President at the World Resources Institute, ‘12

[Manish, “2012: A Breakthrough for Renewable Energy?,” Huffington Post, February 12, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/manish-bapna/2012-a-breakthrough-for-r\_b\_1263543.html]

Despite conventional wisdom, there is a growing body of evidence showing that renewables are no longer decades away from being a viable and affordable alternative to fossil fuels. Instead, onshore wind and solar photovoltaics are close to a tipping point to compete head-to-head with coal and natural gas in many countries. In fact, it’s likely that 2012 could be the year when investment in renewable energy (not counting hydropower) will surpass fossil fuels, signaling a profound shift toward a global clean energy economy. Investors are leading the charge toward a clean energy future, betting heavily on renewable energy. Global investment in clean energy generation capacity reached a record high of $260 billion in 2011, Bloomberg New Energy Finance announced last month. That was up 5 percent above 2010 levels and almost five times the 2004 total. The United States, surprisingly, led the world in renewable energy investment at nearly $56 billion, and China was second with more than $47 billion. Wind farms in China and solar panels on rooftops in Europe are the biggest signs of growth. But the renewables boom is a global phenomenon. In South and Central America, investments rose 39 percent to $13 billion. In India, they rose by 25 percent to almost $4 billion; and in the Middle East and Africa, by 104 percent to $5 billion. So what is getting investors– from asset financiers to venture capitalists— so excited? The answer is simple: wind and solar energy is becoming increasingly cost competitive with coal and natural gas. In the past few years, the costs of PV modules and wind turbines have tumbled, driven mainly by technology innovations and a maturing supply chain. The results are evident in falling clean energy prices around the world. Take just a few examples: In the United States, the authoritative National Renewable Energy Laboratory forecasts that solar PV residential electricity prices could be cost competitive by 2015 across two-thirds of the country. In Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal, and Japan, solar PV is on course to match retail electricity fossil fuel prices next year, without the benefit of subsidies, according to Pike Research. In Brazil, wind power plants undercut natural gas competitors in bidding for government power contract tenders last summer. And in China, wind power prices are expected to be competitive with coal within two years. But before rushing to invest your entire pension in clean energy, there are some important caveats. Renewable power is not yet a mainstream global industry. It made up only a little over 3 percent of total world electricity generation, as of 2009. While its future seems bright, the outcome may hang on how two key issues play out: First is the unpredictable effect of the shale gas boom. In countries, like the United States, where low electricity prices already make it tough for renewables to become cost competitive, abundant and cheap shale gas may drive energy prices down even further and divert investment from wind and solar power. Low-priced natural gas is good for consumers, but it could slow the growth of renewable. This could have additional negative environmental consequences, including on greenhouse gas emissions. The second key issue is whether governments will keep up their investor-friendly commitments to clean energy policy and incentives. The BNEF report, Global Trends in Renewable Energy Investment 2011, showed significant progress on that front. By early 2011, some 119 countries had policies or targets in place to support renewables, more than half of them in the developing world. But given the turbulent global economy, it is likely that fiscal and political constraints will continue to bite across much of the globe in 2012. Governments may see support for wind and solar as tempting for budget cuts. In the United States, for example, wind power developers are nervous about the potential expiration of the Production Tax Credit in December 2012. If Congress fails to renew or replace it, the industry’s robust growth will likely falter. President Obama acknowledged as much during State of the Union, when he called on Congress to extend support for wind power and solar power. So the outlook for the year is still sunny, but not cloudless for renewables. Given the significant strides the industry has made, it would be unfortunate if governments and investors turned their backs now. If they forge ahead, 2012 could indeed see global investment surpass that for fossil fuels, crossing an important threshold toward a clean energy future.

#### Nuclear renaissance now. Pistilli says nuclear is already receiving subsidies and building plants.

#### **Global nuclear expansion now.** Over 200 reactors are going to be constructed in the next five years. That’s 1AC Marketwire.

#### **Saudi Arabia lacks both incentive and ability to flood the oil market.**

Levi and McNally, ‘12

[Robert (President of the Rapidan Group, served as Special Assistant to the President at the U.S. National Economic Council and Senior Director for International Energy at the U.S. National Security Council under President George W. Bush) and Michael (David M. Rubenstein Senior Fellow for Energy and the Environment at the Council on Foreign Relations), “A crude predicament: the era of volatile oil prices." Foreign Affairs 90.4 (2011): 100. Academic OneFile]

A repeat of the boom-bust pattern is now more likely than not. The International Energy Agency, the U.S. Department of Energy, and many experts estimate that Saudi Arabia and its OPEC partners are not investing enough in production capacity today to meet both increasing demand and the five percent threshold for reserves. This is largely because Saudi Arabia, historically the main holder of OPEC's spare capacity, is both less able and less willing to play the part. Saudi officials say they plan to keep as spare capacity only 1.5-2.0 million barrels of oil a day, or less than two percent of global demand. As they regularly note, holding extra capacity is expensive. For example, the Manifa oil field, Saudi Arabia's next big project to shore up production capacity and prevent its spare capacity from dropping even further, will cost about $16 billion just to build and will add only 0.9 million barrels per day of capacity. Despite such efforts to expand production, Saudi Arabia remains worried about oversupplying the market and thus depressing prices, and so it is likely to aim low in its planning for spare capacity. It worries that if demand grows more slowly than anticipated--demand growth in Asia is much tougher to predict than it used to be--or other countries' supplies turn out to be larger than expected, it will be saddled with low prices or massive amounts of unused investment. Just as Saudi Arabia's ability to hold spare capacity is declining, its incentives to do so are waning, too. With U.S.-Saudi ties having frayed over the last decade, Riyadh's motivation to continue contributing to its security partnership with the United States by maintaining spare crude capacity has diminished. In the past, Saudi Arabia held spare capacity partly as a way of disciplining OPEC: spare capacity allowed it to threaten to punish cartel members by flooding the market if they cheated on their quotas. It also allowed Saudi Arabia to align itself with the United States by countering calls for higher oil prices by price hawks such as Iran and Venezuela. But today, Riyadh is less certain about the strength of its alliance with Washington and may thus be less willing to incur the costs and risks involved in contributing to the U.S.-Saudi partnership in these ways. To be sure, Saudi Arabia and OPEC will maintain some influence over oil prices in the future. They can prop them up in the short term by capping production and in the long term by limiting investment in new supplies. But they will not be able to consistently put a lid on prices. U.S. officials have forecast low spare capacity through 2012 (their projections do not extend any further), and the International Energy Agency anticipates that between 2013 and 2016, OPEC's spare capacity will be below the five percent threshold. Some developments could ease the pressure on supplies: a slowdown of economic growth in Asia; improved security in Iraq, leading to increased production there; political change in Iran or Venezuela that allowed international capital and technology to flow into those countries' oil sectors. Yet any of these changes would take many years to translate into large increases in supplies. The development of alternative technologies for transportation, the faster adoption of fuel-efficient vehicles, and the greater use of natural gas in the transportation sector could also change the picture. But such transitions would also take many years, if not decades.

### Plutonium

#### there’s no risk of offense for them. Pursuit of heg is inevitable.

Tellis 9 — Ashley J. Tellis, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace specializing in international security, defense and Asian strategic issues, Research Director of the Strategic Asia program at NBR—the National Bureau of Asian Research, holds a Ph.D. from the University of Chicago, 2009 (“Preserving Hegemony: The Strategic Tasks Facing the United States,” *Global Asia*, Volume 4, Number 1, Available Online at http://globalasia.org/pdf/issue9/Ashley\_J.\_Tellis.pdf, Accessed 09-13-2011, p. 54-55)

This hegemony is by no means fated to end any time soon, however, given that the United States remains predominant by most conventional indicators of national power. The character of the United States’ hegemonic behavior in the future will thus remain an issue of concern both within the domestic polity and internationally. Yet the juvenescence of the United State’s “unipolar moment,” combined with the disorientation produced by the September 11 attacks, ought to restrain any premature generalization that the imperial activism begun by the Clinton administration, and which the Bush administration took to its most spirited apotheosis, would in some way come to define the permanent norm of US behavior in the global system. In all probability, it is much more likely that the limitations on US [end page 54] power witnessed in Afghanistan and Iraq will produce a more phlegmatic and accommodating United States over the longer term, despite the fact that the traditional US pursuit of dominance — understood as the quest to maintain a preponderance of power, neutralize threatening challengers, and protect freedom of action, goals that go back to the foundations of the republic — is unlikely to be extinguished any time soon. ¶ Precisely because the desire for dominance is likely to remain a permanent feature of US geopolitical ambitions — even though how it is exercised will certainly change in comparison to the Bush years — the central task facing the next administration will still pertain fundamentally to the issue of US power. This concern manifests itself through the triune challenges of: redefining the United States’ role in the world, renewing the foundations of US strength, and recovering the legitimacy of US actions. In other words, the next administration faces the central task of clarifying the character of US hegemony, reinvigorating the material foundations of its power, and securing international support for its policies.

#### Decline is net worse – leads to transition wars --- the US will becomeuncooperative and desperate.

Goldstein 7 Professor of Global Politics and International Relations @ University of Pennsylvania “Power transitions, institutions, and China's rise in East Asia: Theoretical expectations and evidence,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume 30, Issue 4 & 5 August 2007, pages 639 – 682

Two closely related, though distinct, theoretical arguments focus explicitly on the consequences for international politics of a shift in power between a dominant state and a rising power. In War and Change in World Politics, Robert Gilpin suggested that peace prevails when a dominant state’s capabilities enable it to ‘govern’ an international order that it has shaped. Over time, however, as economic and technological diffusion proceeds during eras of peace and development, other states are empowered. Moreover, the burdens of international governance drain and distract the reigning hegemon, and challengers eventually emerge who seek to rewrite the rules of governance. As the power advantage of the erstwhile hegemon ebbs, it may become desperate enough to resort to the ultima ratio of international politics, force, to forestall the increasingly urgent demands of a rising challenger. Or as the power of the challenger rises, it may be tempted to press its case with threats to use force. It is the rise and fall of the great powers that creates the circumstances under which major wars, what Gilpin labels ‘hegemonic wars’, break out.13 Gilpin’s argument logically encourages pessimism about the implications of a rising China. It leads to the expectation that international trade, investment, and technology transfer will result in a steady diffusion of American economic power, benefiting the rapidly developing states of the world, including China. As the US simultaneously scurries to put out the many brushfires that threaten its far-flung global interests (i.e., the classic problem of overextension), it will be unable to devote sufficient resources to maintain or restore its former advantage over emerging competitors like China. While the erosion of the once clear American advantage plays itself out, the US will find it ever more difficult to preserve the order in Asia that it created during its era of preponderance. The expectation is an increase in the likelihood for the use of force – either by a Chinese challenger able to field a stronger military in support of its demands for greater influence over international arrangements in Asia, or by a besieged American hegemon desperate to head off further decline. Among the trends that alarm those who would look at Asia through the lens of Gilpin’s theory are China’s expanding share of world trade and wealth (much of it resulting from the gains made possible by the international economic order a dominant US established); its acquisition of technology in key sectors that have both civilian and military applications (e.g., information, communications, and electronics linked with to forestall, and the challenger becomes increasingly determined to realize the transition to a new international order whose contours it will define. the ‘revolution in military affairs’); and an expanding military burden for the US (as it copes with the challenges of its global war on terrorism and especially its struggle in Iraq) that limits the resources it can devote to preserving its interests in East Asia.14 Although similar to Gilpin’s work insofar as it emphasizes the importance of shifts in the capabilities of a dominant state and a rising challenger, the power-transition theory A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler present in The War Ledger focuses more closely on the allegedly dangerous phenomenon of ‘crossover’– the point at which a dissatisfied challenger is about to overtake the established leading state.15 In such cases, when the power gap narrows, the dominant state becomes increasingly desperate. Though suggesting why a rising China may ultimately present grave dangers for international peace when its capabilities make it a peer competitor of America, Organski and Kugler’s power-transition theory is less clear about the dangers while a potential challenger still lags far behind and faces a difficult struggle to catch up. This clarification is important in thinking about the theory’s relevance to interpreting China’s rise because a broad consensus prevails among analysts that Chinese military capabilities are at a minimum two decades from putting it in a league with the US in Asia.16 Their theory, then, points with alarm to trends in China’s growing wealth and power relative to the United States, but especially looks ahead to what it sees as the period of maximum danger – that time when a dissatisfied China could be in a position to overtake the US on dimensions believed crucial for assessing power. Reports beginning in the mid-1990s that offered extrapolations suggesting China’s growth would give it the world’s largest gross domestic product (GDP aggregate, not per capita) sometime in the first few decades of the twentieth century fed these sorts of concerns about a potentially dangerous challenge to American leadership in Asia.17 The huge gap between Chinese and American military capabilities (especially in terms of technological sophistication) has so far discouraged prediction of comparably disquieting trends on this dimension, but inklings of similar concerns may be reflected in occasionally alarmist reports about purchases of advanced Russian air and naval equipment, as well as concern that Chinese espionage may have undermined the American advantage in nuclear and missile technology, and speculation about the potential military purposes of China’s manned space program.18 Moreover, because a dominant state may react to the prospect of a crossover and believe that it is wiser to embrace the logic of preventive war and act early to delay a transition while the task is more manageable, Organski and Kugler’s power-transition theory also provides grounds for concern about the period prior to the possible crossover.19 pg. 647-650

### States CP

#### Perm do both. Solves GOP backlash because thirty republican governors would all back reprocessing.

#### Information distortion means the CP links to politics

**Kiely, ‘12** [2/17/12, Eugene Kiely, Washington assignment editor USA today, “Did Obama ‘Approve’ Bridge Work for Chinese Firms?” http://www.factcheck.org/2012/02/did-obama-approve-bridge-work-for-chinese-firms/]

Who’s to blame, if that’s the right word, if the project ends up using manufactured steel from China? The National Steel Bridge Alliance [blames](http://americanmanufacturing.org/blog/shameful-use-taxpayer-dollars-alaska) the state railroad agency. The Alliance for American Manufacturing [says](http://americanmanufacturing.org/blog/alaskan-manufacturers-outraged-potential-%E2%80%9Cmade-china%E2%80%9D-railroad-bridge) the federal Buy American laws have been “weakened with loopholes and various exemptions that make it easier for bureaucrats to purchase foreign-made goods instead of those made in American factories with American workers.” So, how did Obama get blamed for the decisions by state agencies and for state projects that, in at least one case, didn’t even use federal funds? The answer is a textbook lesson in how information gets distorted when emails go viral. We looked at the nearly 100 emails we received on this subject and found that Obama wasn’t mentioned at all in the first few emails. Typical of the emails we received shortly after the ABC News report aired was this one from Oct. 11, 2011: “I just got an email regarding Diane Sawyer on ABC TV stating that U. S. Bridges and roads are being built by Chinese firms when the jobs should have gone to Americans. Could this possible be true?” The answer: Yes, it’s true. End of story, right? Wrong. Days later, emails started to appear in our inbox that claimed ABC News reported that Chinese firm were receiving stimulus funds to build U.S. bridges — even though the broadcast news story didn’t mention stimulus funds at all. (The report did include a clip of Obama delivering a speech on the need to rebuild America’s bridges and put Americans to work, but said nothing about the president’s $830 billion stimulus bill.) Still, we received emails such as this one on Nov. 4, 2011, that included this erroneous claim language: “Stimulus money meant to create U.S. jobs went to Chinese firms. Unbelievable….” It didn’t take long for Obama to be blamed. That same day — Nov. 4, 2011 — we received an email that made this leap to Obama: “SOME CHINESE COMPANIES WHO ARE BUILDING ‘OUR’ BRIDGES. (3000 JOBS LOST TO THE CHINESE FIRM)…..AND NOW OBAMA WANTS ‘MORE STIMULUS MONEY’…..THIS IS NUTS ! ! ! If this doesn’t make you furious nothing will….” This year, Obama’s name started to surface in the subject line of such critical emails — raising the attack on the president to yet another level and perhaps ensuring the email will be even more widely circulated. Since Jan. 17, we have gotten more than a dozen emails with the subject line, “ABC News on Obama/USA Infrastructure,” often preceded with the word “SHOCKING” in all caps. The emails increasingly contain harsh language about the president. Since Jan. 11, 23 emails carried this added bit of Obama-bashing: “I pray all the unemployed see this and cast their votes accordingly in 2012!” One of those emails — a more recent one from Feb. 8 — contained this additional line: “Tell me again how Obama’s looking out for blue collar guys. He cancels pipelines, and lets Chinese contractors build our bridges…” And so it goes, on and on. All from a news report that blamed state officials — not Obama — for spending taxpayer money on Chinese firms to build U.S. bridges.

#### CP can’t solve – federal investment is necessary to remove the perceptual ban on reprocessing.

Adams, ‘8

[Rod, “What Do You Do About the Waste? Recycle and Reuse”, Clean Technica, 5-29-2008,

<http://cleantechnica.com/2008/05/29/what-do-you-do-about-the-waste-recycle-and-reuse/>, RSR]

The US used to have a plan to recycle our fuel as well, but a great deal of marketing and pressure by people that do not like the idea of using plutonium as a source of commercial heat resulted in President Ford issuing a presidential order to temporarily halt nuclear fuel recycling in 1976. President Carter, a man who claimed to be a nuclear engineer, made that ban permanent in the hopes that forcing US companies to avoid fuel recycling would cause others to abandon the very logical idea. That effort did not work as planned, but the people who had invested large amounts of time and money into building three recycling plants in the US only to have them shut down with the stroke of a pen decided “once bitten, twice shy.” Though President Reagan removed the ban, President Clinton essentially reinstated it and no commercial company has been willing to build a facility and risk having it turn into a white elephant after an election.

#### US stance against reprocessing hurts relations with South Korea and results in South Korean nuclearization.

Yurman, Staff Writer, ‘12

[Dan, “Revisiting Reprocessing in South Korea”, ANS Nuclear Café, 8-2-12,

<http://ansnuclearcafe.org/2012/08/02/revisiting-reprocessing-in-south-korea/>, RSR]

Comes now the request by the South Korean government, first aired in October 2010, to revise the bilateral cooperation treaty with the U.S. It has been in place for more than 40 years and it is a cornerstone of U.S./South Korean diplomatic relations. Many specialists in the field of nonproliferation see a “hard and fast” policy against any expansion of uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing as a key to stopping states like North Korea from pursuing these activities. That strategy hasn’t worked and, as a result, South Korea wants relief from the restriction in the now-decades-old treaty. Negotiations over changes to the treaty have been going on since last December, but appear to be stalemated around a key set of issues. It is a delicate dance, as diplomats like to say, because if the U.S. leans too heavily on South Korea, it could sour relations between the two countries and spawn nationalist sentiment that might lead to a nuclear weapons program. Since the 1950s, South Korea has depended on the U.S. nuclear arsenal as a shield against aggression from its neighbor to the north.

#### US-SoKo relations k2 regional stability and global security

Clinton 10 [Hillary Rodham Clinton, “America’s Engagement in the Asia-Pacific”, October 28, 2010, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/10/150141.htm]

This year also marked a milestone with another ally: the 60th anniversary of the start of the Korean War, which Secretary Gates and I commemorated in Seoul this past summer. And in two weeks, our presidents will meet in Seoul when President Obama travels there for the G-20 summit. Our two countries have stood together in the face of threats and provocative acts from North Korea, including the tragic sinking of the Cheonan by a North Korean torpedo. We will continue to coordinate closely with both Seoul and Tokyo in our efforts to make clear to North Korea there is only one path that promises the full benefits of engagement with the outside world – a full, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization.The alliance between South Korea and the United States is a lynchpin of stability and security in the region and now even far beyond. We are working together in Afghanistan, where a South Korean reconstruction team is at work in Parwan Province; in the Gulf of Aden, where Korean and U.S. forces are coordinating anti-piracy missions. And of course, beyond our military cooperation, our countries enjoy a vibrant economic relationship, which is why our two Presidents have called for resolving the outstanding issues related to the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement by the time of the G-20 meeting in Seoul.

#### East Asian instability leads to World War III

Knight Ridder 2k

(Jonathon S. Landay, “Top administration officials warn stakes for U.S. are high in Asian conflicts”, 3-11, L/N)

Few if any experts think China and Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea, or India and Pakistan are spoiling to fight. But **even a minor miscalculation by any of them could destabilize Asia, jolt the global economy and even start a nuclear war**. India, Pakistan and China all have nuclear weapons, and North Korea may have a few, too. **Asia lacks the kinds of organizations, negotiations and diplomatic relationships that helped keep an uneasy peace for five decades in Cold War Europe. "Nowhere else on Earth are the stakes as high and relationships so fragile**," said Bates Gill, director of northeast Asian policy studies at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank. "**We see the convergence of great power interest overlaid with lingering confrontations with no institutionalized security mechanism in place. There are elements for potential disaster**."

### Immigration

#### Plan solves warming.

Chakravorty et al. 12 (Ujjayant (Professor and Canada Research Chair, Alberta School of Business and Department of Economics); Bertrand Magne (OECD Environment Directorate, Paris, France); Michel Moreaux (Emeritus Professor and IDEI Researcher, Toulouse School of Economics, University of Toulouse), “RESOURCE USE UNDER CLIMATE STABILIZATION: CAN NUCLEAR POWER PROVIDE CLEAN ENERGY?”, Journal of Public Economic Theory, Vol. 14, Issue 2, 2012, RSR)

This paper applies a model with price-induced substitution across resources to examine the role of nuclear power in achieving a climate stabilization target, such as that advocated by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). It asks an important policy question: is nuclear power a viable carbon-free energy source for the future? If so, then at what cost? The main insight is that nuclear power can help us switch quickly to carbon free energy, and if historical growth rates of nuclear capacity are preserved, the costs of reaching climate stabilization goals decline signiﬁcantly and may therefore be at the lower end of cost estimates that are reported by many studies. However, it is also clear from our results that nuclear is economical anyway, even without environmental regulation. Regulation only plays a major part when fast breeders are available and that too, in the somewhat distant future, towards the end of the century. To some extent, recent increases in efﬁciency in U.S. nuclear power attest to its economic advantages, even in a market with no environmental regulation (Davis and Wolfram 2011). The climate goal of 550 ppm of carbon can be achieved at a surplus cost of about 800 billion dollars, or about 1.3% of current world GDP, if no nuclear expansion is undertaken. Achieving this goal using nuclear power will result in a tripling of the share of world nuclear electricity generation by mid century with welfare gains of about half a trillion dollars (in discounted terms). The cost of providing energy will decrease by about $1.3 trillion or 2% of current world GDP, compared to the case in which the level of nuclear generation is frozen. These estimates of cost savings from nuclear power are signiﬁcant, and unlike in previous studies, are derived from an economic model with an explicit nuclear fuel cycle. However, nuclear power can be cost-effective for about 50 years or so, beyond which period, other technologies are likely to take over, including renewables, clean coal and next generation nuclear technologies that are much more efﬁcient in recycling waste materials. Ultimately, large-scale adoption of nuclear power will be hindered by the rising cost of uranium and the problem of waste disposal. Only signiﬁcant new developments such as the availability of new generation nuclear technology that is able to recycle nuclear waste may lead to a steady state where nuclear energy plays an important role. 31

#### **PC isn’t real —butterfly effect – only winners win.**

Hirsh 2/9 (Michael, chief correspondent for National Journal, previously served as the senior editor and national economics correspondent for Newsweek, 2/9/2013, “There’s No Such Thing as Political Capital,” <http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-such-thing-as-political-capital-20130207>, NP)

On Tuesday, in his State of the Union address, President Obama will do what every president does this time of year. For about 60 minutes, he will lay out a sprawling and ambitious wish list highlighted by gun control and immigration reform, climate change and debt reduction. In response, the pundits will do what they always do this time of year: They will talk about how unrealistic most of the proposals are, discussions often informed by sagacious reckonings of how much “political capital” Obama possesses to push his program through.¶ Most of this talk will have no bearing on what actually happens over the next four years.¶ Consider this: Three months ago, just before the November election, if someone had talked seriously about Obama having enough political capital to oversee passage of both immigration reform and gun-control legislation at the beginning of his second term—even after winning the election by 4 percentage points and 5 million votes (the actual final tally)—this person would have been called crazy and stripped of his pundit’s license. (It doesn’t exist, but it ought to.) In his first term, in a starkly polarized country, the president had been so frustrated by GOP resistance that he finally issued a limited executive order last August permitting immigrants who entered the country illegally as children to work without fear of deportation for at least two years. Obama didn’t dare to even bring up gun control, a Democratic “third rail” that has cost the party elections and that actually might have been even less popular on the right than the president’s health care law. And yet, for reasons that have very little to do with Obama’s personal prestige or popularity—variously put in terms of a “mandate” or “political capital”—chances are fair that both will now happen.¶ What changed? In the case of gun control, of course, it wasn’t the election. It was the horror of the 20 first-graders who were slaughtered in Newtown, § Marked 10:35 § Conn., in mid-December. The sickening reality of little girls and boys riddled with bullets from a high-capacity assault weapon seemed to precipitate a sudden tipping point in the national conscience. One thing changed after another. Wayne LaPierre of the National Rifle Association marginalized himself with poorly chosen comments soon after the massacre. The pro-gun lobby, once a phalanx of opposition, began to fissure into reasonables and crazies. Former Rep. Gabrielle Giffords, D-Ariz., who was shot in the head two years ago and is still struggling to speak and walk, started a PAC with her husband to appeal to the moderate middle of gun owners. Then she gave riveting and poignant testimony to the Senate, challenging lawmakers: “Be bold.”¶ As a result, momentum has appeared to build around some kind of a plan to curtail sales of the most dangerous weapons and ammunition and the way people are permitted to buy them. It’s impossible to say now whether such a bill will pass and, if it does, whether it will make anything more than cosmetic changes to gun laws. But one thing is clear: The political tectonics have shifted dramatically in very little time. Whole new possibilities exist now that didn’t a few weeks ago.¶ Meanwhile, the Republican members of the Senate’s so-called Gang of Eight are pushing hard for a new spirit of compromise on immigration reform, a sharp change after an election year in which the GOP standard-bearer declared he would make life so miserable for the 11 million illegal immigrants in the U.S. that they would “self-deport.” But this turnaround has very little to do with Obama’s personal influence—his political mandate, as it were. It has almost entirely to do with just two numbers: 71 and 27. That’s 71 percent for Obama, 27 percent for Mitt Romney, the breakdown of the Hispanic vote in the 2012 presidential election. Obama drove home his advantage by giving a speech on immigration reform on Jan. 29 at a Hispanic-dominated high school in Nevada, a swing state he won by a surprising 8 percentage points in November. But the movement on immigration has mainly come out of the Republican Party’s recent introspection, and the realization by its more thoughtful members, such as Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida and Gov. Bobby Jindal of Louisiana, that without such a shift the party may be facing demographic death in a country where the 2010 census showed, for the first time, that white births have fallen into the minority. It’s got nothing to do with Obama’s political capital or, indeed, Obama at all.¶ The point is not that “political capital” is a meaningless term. Often it is a synonym for “mandate” or “momentum” in the aftermath of a decisive election—and just about every politician ever elected has tried to claim more of a mandate than he actually has. Certainly, Obama can say that because he was elected and Romney wasn’t, he has a better claim on the country’s mood and direction. Many pundits still defend political capital as a useful metaphor at least. “It’s an unquantifiable but meaningful concept,” says Norman Ornstein of the American Enterprise Institute. “You can’t really look at a president and say he’s got 37 ounces of political capital. But the fact is, it’s a concept that matters, if you have popularity and some momentum on your side.”¶ The real problem is that the idea of political capital—or mandates, or momentum—is so poorly defined that presidents and pundits often get it wrong. “Presidents usually over-estimate it,” says George Edwards, a presidential scholar at Texas A&M University. “The best kind of political capital—some sense of an electoral mandate to do something—is very rare. It almost never happens. In 1964, maybe. And to some degree in 1980.” For that reason, political capital is a concept that misleads far more than it enlightens. It is distortionary. It conveys the idea that we know more than we really do about the ever-elusive concept of political power, and it discounts the way unforeseen events can suddenly change everything. Instead, it suggests, erroneously, that a political figure has a concrete amount of political capital to invest, just as someone might have real investment capital—that a particular leader can bank his gains, and the size of his account determines what he can do at any given moment in history.¶ Naturally, any president has practical and electoral limits. Does he have a majority in both chambers of Congress and a cohesive coalition behind him? Obama has neither at present. And unless a surge in the economy—at the moment, still stuck—or some other great victory gives him more momentum, it is inevitable that the closer Obama gets to the 2014 election, the less he will be able to get done. Going into the midterms, Republicans will increasingly avoid any concessions that make him (and the Democrats) stronger.¶ But the abrupt emergence of the immigration and gun-control issues illustrates how suddenly shifts in mood can occur and how political interests can align in new ways just as suddenly. Indeed, the pseudo-concept of political capital masks a larger truth about Washington that is kindergarten simple: You just don’t know what you can do until you try. Or as Ornstein himself once wrote years ago, “Winning wins.” In theory, and in practice, depending on Obama’s handling of any particular issue, even in a polarized time, he could still deliver on a lot of his second-term goals, depending on his skill and the breaks. Unforeseen catalysts can appear, like Newtown. Epiphanies can dawn, such as when many Republican Party leaders suddenly woke up in panic to the huge disparity in the Hispanic vote.¶ Some political scientists who study the elusive calculus of how to pass legislation and run successful presidencies say that political capital is, at best, an empty concept, and that almost nothing in the academic literature successfully quantifies or even defines it. “It can refer to a very abstract thing, like a president’s popularity, but there’s no mechanism there. That makes it kind of useless,” says Richard Bensel, a government professor at Cornell University. Even Ornstein concedes that the calculus is far more complex than the term suggests. Winning on one issue often changes the calculation for the next issue; there is never any known amount of capital. “The idea here is, if an issue comes up where the conventional wisdom is that president is not going to get what he wants, and he gets it, then each time that happens, it changes the calculus of the other actors” Ornstein says. “If they think he’s going to win, they may change positions to get on the winning side. It’s a bandwagon effect.”

#### Plan popular and Graham shields the link.

Russell 2-5 (Pam Radtke, Budget Cutters Eye Nuclear Reprocessing Plant, Roll Call, 5 February 2013, http://www.rollcall.com/news/budget\_cutters\_eye\_nuclear\_reprocessing\_plant-222173-1.html?pg=1, da 2-14-13)

The scrutiny is raising concern among the project’s supporters, especially with across-the-board spending cuts set to kick in next month unless Congress acts to postpone them or enact an alternative austerity plan.¶ “We must stay the course and create a pathway to safely and responsibly dispose of weapons grade plutonium,” Rep. Joe Wilson, R-S.C., wrote in a letter he has been circulating among his colleagues that would urge the White House to preserve the project. “If we fail to uphold our end of this agreement, dire consequences could be felt by our close allies across the globe, as Russia may choose not to honor its end of the agreement.”¶ The MOX facility has survived earlier challenges. Former Rep. David L. Hobson, R-Ohio, said his efforts to kill funding for the project when he served as Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee chairman were thwarted by the political clout of South Carolina lawmakers — including fiscal conservatives such as Wilson, Sen. Lindsey Graham and former Sen. Jim DeMint.¶ Hobson described the project as a jobs program for South Carolina. In addition to the 2,600 employees now working on it, the completed facility will require permanent workers to operate it for up to two decades. The plant is part of the larger Savannah River Site in South Carolina, an Energy Department-managed site that employs 12,000.¶ Hobson said one of the biggest regrets of his tenure was agreeing to back off efforts to end the project when he was told they could hurt Republican Gov. Mark Sanford’s re-election chances in 2006.¶ “I got rolled,” Hobson said.¶ Laura Peterson of Taxpayers for Common Sense, which has called for an end to the project, said conservative Republicans who otherwise might be expected to complain about cost overruns are deterred by the support it enjoys from Graham. And Hobson said DeMint — a leading champion of small government and spending cuts who now heads The Heritage Foundation — never suggested killing the MOX program.¶ “This is worse than earmarks,” Hobson said. “This is appalling.”¶ Neither Graham’s nor DeMint’s staffs responded to requests to comment on the project, but Wilson and other supporters say it is vital to fulfilling the 2000 arms deal with Russia. Failing to move ahead with the program, Wilson warned, could lead the Russians not to honor its end of the agreement.

#### CIR won’t pass – amnesty and enforcement concerns, and Obama tanks the deal – released draft proves

Cohen 2-19 (Tom, Immigration debate: high-stakes political poker, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2013/02/18/politics/immigration-politics/index.html, da 2-22-13)

Whether a political ploy or bona fide proposal, a leaked version of President Barack Obama's draft immigration plan raised Republican hackles while bringing some additional focus to the debate.¶ The draft plan reported over the weekend by USA Today and confirmed to CNN by an administration official included a possible path to coveted permanent residency in eight years for most of the nation's estimated 11 million undocumented immigrants.¶ It also called for steps to strengthen border security and the E-Verify system to check the immigration status of workers.¶ GOP critics pounced, with some objecting to any form of what they label "amnesty" for those in the country illegally. Others accused Obama and the White House of dirty tricks by going public with their draft as a bipartisan group of senators works on a possible agreement.¶ Conservative Sen. Jeff Sessions of Alabama complained on Monday that both the Obama draft and the talks involving the Senate's so-called Gang of Eight seek to "confer legal status and work authorization on Day One in exchange for promises of future enforcement on which this administration will never deliver."¶ "Perhaps this leak, and what it reveals, may mark the beginning of the collapse of this new scheme to force through a fatally flawed plan," Sessions said in a statement.¶ Others accused Obama of deliberately floating an unacceptable plan so that Republicans would reject it, bringing the party further disfavor from Hispanic Americans, the nation's fastest-growing demographic.¶ "Does the president want a result, or does he want another cudgel to beat up Republicans so that he can get political advantage in the next election?" veteran GOP Sen. John McCain of Arizona said Sunday on NBC's "Meet the Press."¶ To former Rep. Connie Mack, a Florida Republican, "a little bit of this is show from everyone, including the president's side."¶ Regardless of how it happened, the leak of Obama's plan "plays into the fears" of Republicans that the president prefers keeping the issue alive for political advantage, Mack told CNN on Monday.¶ His wife -- former Republican Rep. Mary Bono Mack of California -- agreed that the leak added to what she called an already deep trust deficit in Washington.¶ "The American people would be astonished if they knew how little trust existed between the two parties when we have to work together like this," Bono Mack said on CNN.

#### Senate Democrats block in SQUO – Obama has to reach out to them.

Kromm 2-21 (Chris, “Will Southern Democrats derail immigration reform?”, The Institute for Souther Studies,

<http://www.southernstudies.org/2013/02/will-southern-democrats-derail-immigration-reform.html>, RSR)

Ever since President Obama announced his intention to fight -- again -- for broad-ranging immigration reform in his Feb. 13 State of the Union address, media coverage has been dominated by his struggle to find common ground with the so-called Gang of Eight key U.S. Senators, including Florida Republican Sen. Marco Rubio.¶ But Obama's biggest obstacle to pushing through reform in the coming months may be a Gang of Seven Senate Democrats -- including four in the South -- who face difficult elections in 2014 and will be carefully calculating the political pros and cons of embracing Obama's immigration overhaul.¶ Shortly after Obama's speech, Larry Sabato's Center for Politics reported that "the seven most imperiled [U.S. Senate] seats in the whole country are all currently held by Democrats." The top battlegrounds include seats currently held by Sens. Kay Hagan in North Carolina, Mary Landrieu in Louisiana and Mark Pryor in Arkansas, as well as an open seat vacated by retiring Sen. Jay Rockefeller of West Virginia.¶

#### Senate democrats love nuclear power.

Bartash, ‘11

[Jeffry, “Democrats warm to nuclear, domestic drilling”, 4-15-11, Marketwatch

<http://articles.marketwatch.com/2011-04-15/economy/30789692_1_nuclear-power-nuclear-plants-nuclear-energy>, RSR]

WASHINGTON (MarketWatch) — At a hearing this week, Democratic Sen. Tom Carper of Delaware asked one of the nation’s top regulators how many Americans have been killed by nuclear power. ”There are no known fatalities in the U.S. from the use of nuclear energy,” replied Gregory Jaczko, chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Carper then turned to Lisa Jackson, administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency. He asked her how many people have been killed or had their lives shortened by the use of pollution-emitting fossil fuels. Tens of thousands, she said. The senator sat back in his chair and nodded. “All sources of energy involve risks,” he said. Carper, a longtime supporter of nuclear power, is not the only Democrat who’s weighing every option available on how to fuel the massive U.S. economy. Many other members of his party are as well — no doubt egged on by soaring gas prices and public discontent. And while Democrats aren’t chanting “drill, baby, drill,” they appear to be concluding that nuclear power and more domestic drilling, once anathema, are vital to America’s energy future. At several hearings this week, nary a word was said about abolishing nuclear power despite the recent disaster in Japan. And Democrats say the are open to drilling for more natural gas in the continental U.S. despite growing concerns over an extraction practice called “fracking.”